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Abstract 
We present a method for taking advantage of labour market transitions to identify the effects of 
financial incentives on employment decisions. The framework we use is very flexible and by 
imposing few theoretical assumptions it allows us to extend the modelled sample relative to 
structural models. We take advantage of this flexibility to include disabled persons in the model 
and to jointly analyse the behaviour of disabled and non-disabled persons. A great deal of 
attention is paid to the appropriate modelling of financial incentives in the labour market. In the 
case of disabled persons, taking account of financial incentives turns out to be an extremely 
complex process but one that in the end turns out to be well worth the effort. The model is used 
to compare reactions in the labour market to marginal changes in financial incentives and also to 
model one of the most important reforms of the UK Labour government – the introduction of 
the Working Families’ Tax Credit. The methodology relies on matching the transition and 
income data derived from cross-sectional and panel surveys, and could be used in other 
countries for which detailed, reliable income data are not collected in a panel format. 
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1. Introduction 
Since first being elected in 1997, the Labour government in the UK has introduced a number of 
reforms to the country’s tax and benefit system. Starting in 1999, the system of in-work support 
for low-earning families with children and for disabled persons in work (with or without 
children) was reformed in a way that made it significantly more generous than the previous 
system. Table 1 below gives details of the main types of benefits and tax credits in the UK and 
shows the principal reforms between 1997 and 2003. This paper focuses on the effect of what 
broadly might be called the ‘first round’ of reforms, occurring between 1999 and 2002 (the 
‘second round’ of reforms in 2003 focused more on changes to the administration and labelling 
of benefits and tax credits rather than their financial value).
1 More detailed information on these 
reforms can be found in Dickens, Gregg & Wadsworth (2003), Balls, Grice & O’Donnell (2004) 
and Shaw & Sibieta (2005).  
The methodology presented in this paper originates from the work done by Gregg, Johnson & 
Reed (1999), who developed a model of labour market entry for the UK labour force. The 
analysis accounts for labour market dynamics to a greater extent as we model both employment 
entry  and exit. Perhaps more importantly, the methodology offers an original treatment of 
individuals in couples in the labour market. The other key features of the model are: 
•  It relies on estimating the probability of transition between different labour market states, 
conditional on being in a certain state a year earlier (this is implemented using 
information from the Labour Force Survey (LFS), which follows families for five 
quarterly interviews). 
•  In addition to controlling for characteristics such as age and family status, the model 
conditions these transition probabilities on the financial incentives individuals encounter 
in the labour market. Financial incentives are estimated using the Family Resources 
Survey (FRS) and the tax and benefit microsimulation model of the Institute for Fiscal 
Studies (IFS), TAXBEN. The calculation of financial incentives accounts for the partial 
take-up of some benefits and treats childcare costs as fixed costs of working. Information 
on financial incentives from the LFS and FRS is matched.  
•  The model includes disabled persons and we present a detailed framework for modelling 
financial incentives for this group of the working-age population. Individuals are treated 
as ‘disabled’ for the purposes of the estimation if they report ‘work-limiting disability’ or 
claim disability benefits (or both). 
                                                      
1 In addition, there were reforms to the direct tax system over the period – for example, a 10% starting 
rate of income tax was introduced over a narrow band of income in 1999, and basic-rate income tax was 
reduced in 2000. Payroll taxes were also reformed: the structure of National Insurance contributions was 
changed slightly to make it more consistent with income tax and the rates were raised in 2003.  2 | MYCK & REED
 
 
•  Single persons and those who live in couples are treated separately for the purpose of the 
estimation (as is the case with most structural models).  
Table 1. Main benefits and tax credits in the UK system and reforms between 1997 and 2003 
Benefit/tax credit   Situation in 1997  Reforms 1997-2003 
In-work support 
for families with 
children in which 
in-work earnings 
are low  
Family Credit available for those working 
16 hours or more per week; limited 
additional childcare support through income 
disregard; a full-time bonus available for 
working 30 hours or more per week; means-
tested – withdrawn at 70% when net income 
is above a specified threshold 
1999: Working Families’ Tax Credit 
(WFTC) replaces Family Credit; it is 
similar in structure but more generous, with 
a lower taper (55%) and more support for 
childcare through a childcare credit  
2000-02: Generosity of WFTC gradually 
extended  
2003: WFTC replaced by two tax credits – 
Child Tax Credit (CTC) and Working Tax 
Credit (WTC); generosity is similar but the 
assessment period for means test and 
structure of benefits are different  
Support for 
disabled persons 
when out of work: 
contributory 
benefit 
Incapacity Benefit (IB) available for 
individuals who are incapable of work (and 
satisfy a personal capability assessment 
from a doctor); paid to those with sufficient 
previous payroll (National Insurance) 
contributions, although this requirement is 
waived in some cases; it has a range of rates 
according to how long a claimant has been 
on the benefit (the rate rises over time)  
Claim conditions tightened at various points 
over this period  
2001: IB made partly means-tested on 
private or occupational pension income  
Support for 
disabled persons 
when out of work:  
non-contributory 
benefit 
Income Support, the main benefit for 
persons not in work who are not expected 
by the government to seek work owing to 
sickness or disability, includes Disability 
Premia (ISDP); a range of different levels of 
the benefit are payable depending on the 
severity of disability; the benefit is means-
tested with withdrawal at 100% once gross 
income is above a certain threshold; many 
IB claimants are also eligible for ISDP as 
IB by itself is insufficient to float 
individuals off the means test  
Slight changes to eligibility rules; increases 
in child additions for Income Support, but 
little change in the generosity of Disability 
Premia in real terms 
Help with mobility 
and care costs for 
disabled persons 
Disability Living Allowance (DLA), 
payable at a range of rates for persons who 
require significant amounts of help in 
connection with their bodily functions or 
with making outside journeys 
No major changes over this period  
In-work support 
for disabled 
persons with low 
earnings 
Disability Working Allowance (DWA), 
with a structure similar to that of Family 
Credit  
1999: Disabled Persons Tax Credit (DPTC) 
replaces DWA; rates and structure similar 
to WFTC for the most part  
2003: In-work support for disabled persons 
combined with support for families with 
children in the Working Tax Credit (WTC) 
scheme; additional premia available for 
disabled persons  
Source: Authors’ data. 
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Explicit treatment of disability in labour market models is rare, and to our knowledge none of 
the models applied to UK data has attempted to link disability to choices of labour market 
participation. Early US studies of the relationship between disability and labour market 
participation (e.g. Parsons, 1982 and Slade, 1984) suggested a very strong relationship between 
the value of out-of-work disability benefits and employment. Bound (1989) argued, however, 
that these studies exaggerated the effect of disability benefits. He showed that a large proportion 
of the fall in employment among disabled persons recorded in the US would have occurred with 
or without the disability benefit scheme. 
Most of the recent studies analysing the relationship between disability and labour market 
participation use semi- or non-structural approaches. In some cases, so-called ‘natural 
experiments’ enable the identification of labour supply elasticities and responsiveness for 
disabled persons (Gruber, 2000 and Campolieti, 2003). In others, as for example in Harkness 
(1993), although the authors develop a structural model, the estimation is then conducted in a 
non-structural fashion. Nevertheless, a distinctive feature of these models is that the estimations 
are conducted solely on disabled persons and are therefore not directly comparable with the 
non-disabled population. Compared with estimates derived from natural experiments, the model 
presented here is more general and not specific to a given policy or area of the country.  
This paper is organised as follows. Section 2 presents the structure of the labour supply models 
that we estimate. Section 3 explains specifically how the model uses information on the changes 
in financial incentives that individuals and families face as a result of the benefit reforms to 
estimate the models. Section 4 briefly explains how the model is used to simulate the labour 
supply effects of changes to benefit policies. Section 5 details the data we use and in particular 
how ‘disability’ is defined in the data. Section 6 presents the results of the labour supply model. 
Section 7 concludes.  
2.  The modelling structure 
In this section we present an overview of the whole modelling process. In the estimation we rely 
on matching information derived from two different datasets (the LFS and FRS). This process is 
described in detail in section 3.4. While financial incentives are calculated using the FRS, 
employment transitions can only be observed in the LFS, which is a five-quarter, rolling panel 
dataset. The estimation of financial incentives takes into account the partial take-up of several 
benefits, along with modelling the benefits for disabled persons and giving consideration to the 
cost of childcare for those with young children. These features of the modelling process make 
the calculation of financial incentives much more accurate but at the same time imply a greater 
complexity of the whole modelling process. The overall process can be divided into four stages: 
i)  computation of expected values for inputs into the tax and benefit simulation (done using 
the FRS and LFS); 
ii)  computation of incomes in different employment states and under different take-up 
scenarios (done using the FRS); 
iii)  calculation of the financial incentives in different employment states including the partial 
take-up of benefits and childcare use (done using the FRS for non-disabled persons and 
the LFS for disabled persons); and 
iv)  estimation of labour-market transition models.  
We begin the description of the methodology with details of the estimation procedures for 
single persons and couples. In each case we estimate the probability of changing the labour 
market state between waves 1 and 5 of the LFS, i.e. in two periods separated by a year. The 
estimated probability is thus the probability of being in a state of employment at time (t) 
conditional on the employment state a year earlier (at time (t-1)).  4 | MYCK & REED
 
 
2.1 Modelling  the  transitions of single persons 
Two separate equations are estimated for single persons: 
1)  an entry equation for the sub-sample of persons who were not employed in period (t-1); 
and 
2)  an exit equation for those who were employed at (t-1).  
Let  , it work  be an indicator variable describing whether person ‘i’ is employed at time (t). The 
probability that someone not working enters work – or the ‘entry model’ – can be represented 
as: 
'
,, 1 1 , Pr( 1| 0) ( )
entry
it it it work work X β − == = Φ      (1) 
and the probability that someone working stops work – or the ‘exit model’ – can be represented 
as: 
'
,, 1 2 , Pr( 0| 1) ( )
exit
jt jt jt work work X β − == = Φ      (2) 
In practice, each individual in the data can contribute to only one of these two equations, 
depending on their employment status at time (t-1). Function  (.) Φ is the normal cumulative 
distribution function, and X
entry
it  and  X
exit
jt are vectors of regressors including individual 
characteristics. In our approach, the regressors include the characteristics of age, family 
structure, disability status, region, etc., plus the financial incentives encountered by individuals 
in the labour market, i.e. incomes in and out of work.  
2.2 Modelling  the  transitions  of individuals in couples 
In the model we use for couples, we identify initial employment states at the level of the couple 
and not the individual, and then model couples’ behaviour as a bivariate choice made by 
partners individually but allowing for correlation between partners’ decisions.
2  
The semi-structural approach makes no assumptions concerning the process that determines the 
observed distributions of hours of work. The method is consistent with the view that the 
decisions of one member of the couple affect and are affected by the choices of the other, and 
represents a natural extension of the methodology used to model single individuals.  
Our modelling of couples distinguishes among four states a couple can be in: 
1)  a man working and a woman working (which we refer to as a (1,1) couple, to which we 
assign the parameter value Di,t=1); 
2)  a man working and a woman not working (a (1,0) couple, Di,t=2); 
3)  a man not working and a woman working (a (0,1) couple, Di,t=3); and 
4)  a man not working and a woman not working (a (0,0) couple, Di,t=4). 
                                                      
2 The initial methodology was based on modelling the couples’ choice with the multinomial logit model. 
The need to include a large set of regressors makes the bivariate probit model a more natural choice and 
we would like to thank Alan Duncan for suggesting this approach. As Myck (2005) demonstrates, for the 
same set of regressors the performance of these two models in terms of generated response to changes in 
financial incentives is very similar.   TAX AND BENEFIT REFORMS IN A MODEL OF LABOUR MARKET TRANSITIONS | 5 
 
The aim of our labour supply model is to model the transitions of individuals in couples 
between these states conditional on the state at time (t-1). The sample is therefore divided into 
four sub-samples: (1,1), (1,0), (0,1) and (0,0), and then we model the transitions as a choice 
made by each of the partners allowing for correlation between their decisions. This means that 
we estimate four separate sets of equations for couples in the sample.  
In the case of analysing partners’ choices at their individual level the transition probability for 
the two partners is described by the bivariate normal cumulative distribution function. For 
example, the probability of choosing state (‘q’) in the case of couples that are in employment 
state (1,0) at time (t-1) is: 
) * * , * , * ( ) 2 | Pr( 2 , , ρ π π β π β π
w m
w
w
i
w
m
m
i
m
t i t i X X D q D Φ = = = ,     for q = 1,2,3,4   (3) 
where 
m π  is 1 if the man exits and –1 if he does not, while 
w π  is 1 if the woman enters and –1 
if she does not. Vectors 
m
i X  and 
w
i X  include net income variables.  (.) 2 Φ is the bivariate 
normal CDF, and ρ  is the correlation parameter denoting the extent of correlation between the 
two transition equations for men and for women. Corresponding expressions for transition 
probabilities can be written for the other three initial employment states.  
3.  Modelling financial incentives 
The first stage of the modelling process consists of estimating gross wages for labour market 
entrants (i.e. those who are not employed). Because the model only distinguishes between 
employment and non-employment we also estimate a measure of the expected number of hours 
worked if employed. For persons with children we also estimate the cost of childcare under 
different employment scenarios (for example, if both parents are working or if either of them is 
working).  
Below we discuss how financial incentives are calculated for non-disabled persons (section 3.1) 
and disabled persons (section 3.2). We must remember here that financial incentives in the 
transitions model (estimated on the LFS) are imputed from the FRS by matching group-average 
values of financial incentives for individuals or couples with the same characteristics. Section 
3.4 gives brief details of this matching procedure. Section 3.1 also explains how the 
intermediate equations for wages, hours of work and childcare costs are estimated.
3  
3.1   Financial incentives for persons without disabilities 
For individuals with disabilities, the modelling of financial incentives is conducted almost 
entirely using the FRS. The only exception is made for the estimation of entry wages. This is 
estimated using the LFS data, in which we can identify persons who enter employment between 
time (t-1) and (t). The computation of financial incentives, both in and out of work, is most 
straightforward in the case of non-disabled persons without children. To calculate financial 
incentives for this group the FRS information on demographics, assets, area of residence, etc., 
and require a measure we use of gross wage and of hours of work when employed. Hours of 
work are estimated on the FRS sample of working persons using OLS regression on the sample 
of those employed, with regressors as shown in Table 2. The wages for the non-employed 
sample are imputed using an entry-wage equation run on the LFS entry sample. The entry-wage 
equations are estimated for men and women separately using OLS on the log hourly wage 
measure, and the regressors comprise: year dummies, a cubic in age, age at which the person 
left full-time education, a regional dummy for London and the South East (which are 
                                                      
3 Detailed results of the intermediate models are available from the authors on request. 6 | MYCK & REED
 
 
particularly high wage areas in the UK), marital status and a disability dummy. The precise 
treatment of wages in the model is a little more complex; we return to this issue in section 3.3. 
For the moment let us just assume that for all individuals in our sample we have a measure of 
expected hours of work when employed and a measure of gross hourly wage. 
Table 2. Regressors used for hours equations 
Regressor  Single 
men no 
children 
Single 
women 
no 
children 
Single 
parents 
Married 
men 
Married 
women 
Year dummies  ●  ●  ●  ●  ● 
Cubic in age  ●  ●  ●  ●  ● 
Age left full-
time education 
●  ●  ●  ●  ● 
Regional 
dummies 
●  ●  ●  ●  ● 
Number of 
children 
– – ●  ●  ● 
Age of 
youngest child 
– – ●  ●  ● 
Disability 
dummy 
●  ●  ●  ●  ● 
Number of obs  9,962  8,004  3,895  29,940  25,293 
Note: ● indicates use in sub-sample regression on employed persons in the FRS 
Source: Authors’ data. 
 
Using these measures of hours of work and gross hourly wage we can compute income in and 
out of work for individual ‘i’ (who does not have children) in the LFS sample as: 
∑
=
=
Jg
jg
jg jg E
E
ig w h f
Jg
Y
1
0 , ) *, , ˆ (
1
ς         (4) 
while for a couple ‘i’ (also without children) as: 
∑
=
=
Jg
jg
w
jg
w
jg E
m
jg
m
jg E
E
ig w h w h f
Jg
Y
1
0 , , ) *, , ˆ *, , ˆ (
1
ς      (5) 
where 
•  ‘i’ and ‘j’ index individuals in the LFS and FRS samples respectively, ‘g’ indexes a 
specific group and ‘E’ is a specified employment state.
4 For couples indices ‘m’ and ‘w’ 
identify the man and the woman respectively; 
•  ‘Jg’ is the number of individuals (or couples) ‘j’ in group ‘g’ in the FRS; 
                                                      
4 ‘E’ takes values 0 (non-employed) and 1 (employed) for single persons and 1 (state (1,1)), 2 (state 
(1,0)), 3 (state (0,1)) and 4 (state (0,0)) for couples.  TAX AND BENEFIT REFORMS IN A MODEL OF LABOUR MARKET TRANSITIONS | 7 
 
•  jg E h , ˆ  is a measure of hours worked in employment state ‘E’, which for non-employment 
takes value 0 and for employment is a measure of expected hours worked based on the 
linear hours equation;  
•  * jg w  is a gross wage measure;  
•  0 ς stands for the tax and benefit system in place at the time the data was collected; and  
•  the net income of individuals in the FRS is a function (.) f  of hours of work, gross hourly 
wages and the tax and benefit system. 
The calculation is more complex for those with children because it accounts for take-up of the 
Working Families’ Tax Credit (WFTC), the probability of childcare use and the use of childcare 
subsidies in scenarios where at least one person in the family is employed.
5 Let us define three 
variations of the tax and benefit system:  
•  ‘ς1’ is a system with WFTC childcare subsidies in which everyone takes up 100% of their 
modelled WFTC entitlement; 
•  ‘ς2’is a system without WFTC childcare subsidies in which everyone takes up 100% of 
their modelled WFTC entitlement; and 
•  ‘ς3’ is a system in which no one takes up the WFTC. 
Defining ‘M’ as a vector of hours of work and gross hourly wages and C ˆ  as the predicted 
childcare cost in the employment state ‘E’, we can define three measures of net income for 
family ‘j’ in the FRS: 
) ˆ , , ( , 1 ,
1
, j E j E j E C M q Y ς =  
) , ( 2 ,
2
, ς j E j E M q Y =  
) , ( 3 ,
3
, ς j E j E M q Y =                                        (6) 
Let 
WFTC P ˆ
 be the expected measure of WFTC take-up, i.e. a measure of probability that the 
family claims the WFTC, conditional on being eligible for it. Also let 
C P ˆ
  be a predicted 
measure of childcare use, i.e. a measure of probability that the family will use childcare in a 
given employment scenario. Then function  (.) f  from equations (4) and (5) takes the following 
form: 
] ˆ * ˆ [ ] ˆ * ) ˆ * ) ( [( ] [ ) ˆ , ( , , ,
3
, ,
2
,
1
,
2
,
3
, , ,
C
j E j E
WFTC
j E j E
C
j E j E j E j E j E j E j E P C P Y P Y Y Y Y C M f − − − + + =     (7) 
The first term in square brackets on the right-hand side is value of net family income in 
employment state ‘E’ in the scenario where they do not claim the WFTC. The second term in 
square brackets is the expected value of the WFTC, taking into account the value of childcare 
subsidies (multiplied by the probability of childcare use) and the probability of WFTC take-up. 
                                                      
5 The take-up rate for Income Support/Jobseekers Allowance, Housing Benefit and Council Tax Benefit is 
assumed to be 100% for all individuals in the sample. In the case of these benefits this assumption seems 
acceptable given that take-up rates for these benefits are in the range of 80-95% (see for example 
Department of Social Security, 1999). 8 | MYCK & REED
 
 
The third term is the expected childcare cost, given the calculated value of childcare weighted 
by the expected probability of using it.
6  
The final measure of net income for family ‘i’ in the LFS is an average for the corresponding 
group in the FRS in the same way as for those without children. 
Table 3 gives a list of the regressors used in the different childcare equations – the childcare 
cost equation, the equation to determine the hours of paid childcare among families that use 
paid childcare, the equation to determine the use of childcare and the equation for the take-up of 
Family Credit/WFTC.  
Table 3. Regressors used for childcare hours, cost and take-up equations 
Regressor 
Hourly 
childcare 
cost 
Hours of paid 
childcare 
among those 
who use it 
Use of 
paid 
childcare 
Take-up of 
Family 
Credit/WFTC 
Year dummies  ●  ●  ●  ● 
Cubic in age  –  ●  ● – 
Male dummy  –  ●  ●  ● 
Age left full-time 
education 
–  ●  ● – 
Regional dummies  ●  ●  ●  ● 
More than two 
children 
  ●  ●  ● 
Age of youngest 
child 
●  ●  ●  ● 
Hourly childcare cost  –  ● – – 
Non-employed 
household member 
– – ● – 
Value of WFTC 
eligibility 
– – –  ● 
Works less than 30 
hrs per week 
–  ●  ●  ● 
Number of obs  3,666  815  3,373  1,764 
Note: ● indicates use in sub-sample regression on employed persons in FRS 
Source: Authors’ data. 
 
3.2  Financial incentives for disabled persons 
For those with disabilities we add another stage that allows a more precise allocation of the 
major disability benefits – Incapacity Benefit (IB), the Disability Living Allowance (DLA) and 
the Disabled Persons Tax Credit (DPTC). The reason for doing so, rather than following the  
 
 
                                                      
6Detailed results of the childcare cost and childcare hours equations, Family Credit/WFTC take-up 
modelling and childcare-use probability models are available from the authors on request.   TAX AND BENEFIT REFORMS IN A MODEL OF LABOUR MARKET TRANSITIONS | 9 
 
methodology used for modelling the WFTC (for example), is that on the basis of the data alone 
it is difficult to determine eligibility for disability benefits. Therefore, standard take-up 
modelling methods cannot be easily applied. As we show below, in cases where take-up 
modelling is necessary, the LFS contains more information than the FRS. This extra information 
can be used in a disability-benefit eligibility/take-up model. Given the computational intensity 
of this method we apply it only to the most commonly claimed disability benefits: the IB, DLA 
and DPTC. In addition, our methodology also indirectly models the Income Support Disability 
Premiums (ISDP).
7 
For disabled individuals and for couples with a disabled person, we compute net incomes in 
different employment states in a greater number of scenarios than for those without disabilities.
8 
The scenarios are determined by ‘imposed’ benefit eligibility. For example, we calculate net 
incomes in work and out of work assuming that the person receives the DLA and assuming that 
s/he does not. As a consequence each disabled person in the LFS sample is assigned several in- 
and out-of-work measures of income. To use the DLA example, for a single disabled individual 
without children we therefore have: 
∑
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In the case of the DLA, whether income is assigned including or excluding the DLA is 
determined by recorded benefit receipt by person ‘i’ in the LFS data. Since the DLA is 
independent of employment status, if a person declares receipt of the DLA in the data, s/he is 
assigned an income with the benefit both in and out of work. 
 
                                                      
7 The Income Support Disability Premium (ISDP) is an addition to Income Support, which is the main 
means-tested income replacement benefit in the UK. As disabled persons tend to be poorer than the rest 
of the UK population on average, the ISDP is a very commonly claimed, means-tested disability-related 
benefit. Unfortunately, neither of the datasets we use contains explicit information on whether a family 
receives the ISDP as a specific component of its Income Support or not. We only have information on 
whether individuals receive Income Support and (in the case of the FRS) the total Income Support 
amount. Since Income Support is means-tested, knowing the amount of the benefit received does not 
allow the identification of whether or not someone receives the disability premium. The only way of 
imputing the receipt of the premium is through the identification of another disability-related benefit on 
which the ISDP is made conditional (the so-called ‘qualifying benefit’).  
As a consequence, the ISDP is automatically added in the TAXBEN model for all those who are eligible 
to receive Income Support and receive a qualifying benefit. Since the model assumes a 100% take-up of 
Income Support, in calculating the net incomes in different scenarios the model extends this assumption 
to disability premiums for those who claim a qualifying benefit. Both the DLA and IB are qualifying 
benefits. Therefore in our procedure of computing incomes for disabled persons as described above, the 
net incomes out of work that are calculated for disabled persons under the assumption of receiving the 
DLA or IB also include the ISDP. 
8 For details on the employment/benefit claim scenarios in which net income are calculated, see the 
appendix. 10 | MYCK & REED
 
 
The allocation of the benefit is slightly different in the case of IB because eligibility for IB is 
dependent, among other things, on being out of work. For individuals who are observed in the 
LFS as being out of work (‘E’ = 0) at time (t) we use the same method as for the DLA. We 
compute: 
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and allocate the income that corresponds to the recorded IB claim. Yet, since we also need a 
measure of financial incentives out of work for those who are employed at time (t) (and who 
therefore cannot have a recorded IB claim), we estimate an IB take-up/eligibility equation on 
the basis of information from the LFS at time (t-1) and (t).
9 A predicted take-up/eligibility 
probability measure (
IB
i P ˆ ) is then derived for all those who are disabled and in work at time (t) 
and a measure of income out of work is calculated using the predicted IB take-up probability, as 
follows (note that ‘i’ identifies a person in the LFS): 
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Our calculations of income out of work also account for the possibility of joint receipt of the IB 
and DLA. For those who are out of work with recorded IB and DLA receipt we allocate: 
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while for those in work at time (t) with a recorded receipt of the DLA we calculate income out 
of work as: 
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Because the DPTC is an in-work benefit it is only allocated to incomes in the in-work scenarios 
(‘E’=1). Group level income with the DPTC is calculated as: 
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This measure of income is allocated to persons who work at time (t) and are recorded as 
claiming the DPTC in the LFS. We also allocate this measure of income for the in-work 
scenario to individuals who are out of work at time (t) and who are recorded as receiving the IB. 
Those who either work and receive both the DLA and the DPTC or are not working and receive 
the IB and the DLA are assigned income with the DPTC and the DLA as income for their in-
work scenario. 
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A similar methodology is used when calculating the financial incentives for couples, but it 
recognises that there are more possibilities with regard to who receives particular benefits.
10  
For disabled persons with children the same methodology is applied but in line with the 
calculation for non-disabled persons we calculate incomes under the three variations of the tax 
and benefit system  ) , , ( 3 2 1 ς ς ς  defined in section 3.1, making different DLA, IB and DPTC 
claim assumptions.
11 
3.3  Treatment of wages 
One of the key determinants of financial incentives to work is the gross hourly wage. The model 
requires us to calculate financial incentives to work for those who are observed in work (and 
therefore for whom we know the actual hourly wage) and for those who are not. In the latter 
case, a wage prediction is needed.  
The approach we use to model wages is to use actual wages for persons with observed wages, 
and for those without to integrate net incomes in work over the distribution of the residual. This 
treatment ensures that wages for those with and without observed wages are drawn from the 
same conditional distributions. It leads to estimating transition models for non-workers (and for 
couples with at least one non-working partner) using simulated maximum likelihood estimation 
methods.  
Simulating the likelihood function 
In the case of the entry probit model the simulated likelihood function we estimate is:  
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where  ‘i’ indexes individuals in the LFS entry sample and  k i X ϖ ,  is a vector of individual 
characteristics and includes a measure of income in work based on the wage measure  k ϖ  using 
the k
th draw from the wage distribution. Here ‘q’ takes value 1 if the person enters and (–1) if 
the person does not enter.  
Similarly we can derive a simulated likelihood function for the bivariate probit estimation for 
couples. Using the example from equation (3) in the bivariate probit specification we estimate 
the following log likelihood function: 
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where 
m π  is 1 if the man exits and –1 if he does not, while 
w π  is 1 if the woman enters and –1 
if she does not. Vectors
m
k j X ϖ ,  and 
w
k j X ϖ ,  include net income variables and  k ϖ indicates the k
th 
draw from the entry wage distribution.  
Similar simulated likelihood functions can be derived for (0,1) and (0,0) couples. For the exit 
model and for (1,1) couples we do not need to use the simulated likelihood estimation since we 
use observed wages to calculate incomes in work. 
                                                      
10 See the appendix for details. 
11 Again, for details see the appendix. 12 | MYCK & REED
 
 
In the example where only the man is working at time (t-1) net incomes calculated for the (0,1) 
and (1,1) scenario are based on the actual wages of the man and on the woman’s wages drawn 
from the conditional wage distribution. Net incomes are calculated k times on the basis of k 
independent draws from the wage distribution. For couples (0,0), i.e. those in which neither of 
the partners are employed at time (t-1), we draw independently from the distribution of men’s 
and women’s wages k times and calculate net incomes at the couple level for different scenarios 
for k pairs of wages.
12  
3.4  Matching the data of the LFS and FRS 
In matching the income information from the FRS with that in the LFS we have followed the 
method applied in the original labour-market transitions project (Gregg, Johnson & Reed, 
1999). This relies on averaging incomes in groups defined by certain observable characteristics 
in the FRS and allocating these averages to corresponding groups in the LFS. The group-
defining characteristics have been adjusted to take account of different age criteria and of 
disability status. Grouping is done exclusively within different employment status groups (i.e. 
employed and non-employed for singles and the four employment states for couples defined by 
the employment status of the partners). Single persons are grouped by the following 
characteristics: 
•  data year, by four years (1999-00 to 2002-03) 
•  gender, by two groups  
•  age, by five age groups – 20-24, 25-36, 37-50, 51-54 and 55-59 (women)/64(men) 
•  education, by three groups – left school aged <17, left school at 17-18, left school at 19+ 
•  residence, by two groups – either living in London/South East or not 
•  children, by three groups – no children, one or two children, three children or more 
•  age of the youngest child, by two groups – have a child aged 0-4 or not 
•  disability, by two groups – disabled or not disabled. 
For couples the following characteristics have been used to group the data: 
•  data year, by four years (1999-00 to 2002-03) 
•  age of the man, by five age groups – 20-24, 25-30, 30-36, 37-44, 45-54 and 55-65 
•  age of the woman, by four age groups for (1,1) couples – 20-32, 33-44, 45-54 and 55-60; 
by three age groups for other couple types – 20-32, 32-54 and 55-60 
•  education level, by five groups for (1,1) couples: 1) both partners left school aged 19+; 2) 
the man left school aged 19+ and the woman aged <19; 3) the woman left school aged 
19+ and the man aged <19; 4) the man left school aged 17 or 18 and the woman aged 
<19; and 5) the man left school aged <17 and the woman aged <19; by four groups for 
other couple types: 1) both partners left school aged 19+; 2) either of the partners left 
school aged 19+; 3) either of the partners left school aged 17 or 18 but no one left school 
aged 19+; 4) both left school aged <17  
•  residence, by two groups – either living in London/South East or not 
                                                      
12 Note that in this case we would ideally want to use a double-integral over wage distributions of the man 
and the woman. This is done for example in van Soest’s (1995) structural model. Such an approach 
would, however, require k
2 number of final net incomes for (0,0) couples. Given the already high 
computational intensity of the model we decided to draw pairs of wages only k times.  TAX AND BENEFIT REFORMS IN A MODEL OF LABOUR MARKET TRANSITIONS | 13 
 
•  children, by three groups – no children, one or two children, three children or more 
•  age of youngest child, by two groups – have a child aged 0-4 or not 
•  disability, by two groups – either of the partners is disabled or none of the partners 
disabled. 
4.  Simulating a policy change 
The methodology developed in this paper is intended as a tool for policy analysis in which the 
key area of interest is the simulation of the employment effects of changes to taxes and benefits. 
In section 6 we present the results of simulating the effects of the introduction of the WFTC in 
1999, holding all other aspects of the tax and benefit system constant. The policy simulation 
involves the following stages: 
i)  calculating expected transition probabilities (for example from non-employment to 
employment) using the original financial incentive variables on which the model is 
estimated (i.e. using the ‘base’ tax and benefit system); 
ii)  replacing the financial incentive variables with incentives calculated using a ‘reformed’ 
tax and benefit regime (i.e. incentives after the introduction of a reform, such as the 
WFTC) and calculating the expected transition probabilities using the new financial 
incentive variables; and 
iii)  with the two sets of expected transition probabilities, calculating the expected number of 
individuals in various employment states under the two regimes. The difference between 
these is the employment effect of the simulated reform. 
Using the estimated model coefficients from the transition equations we produce a vector of 
predicted probabilities corresponding to potential employment states for each benefit unit:  
)) ˆ *, , ( , ( ˆ
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where Xi is a vector of individual characteristics included in the model and 
E
iB Y  is a vector of 
incomes in ‘E’ employment states for individual/couple ‘i’ (for whom we predicted employment 
hours  i h ˆ  and wages  * i w  (two of these in the case of couples)) using the base tax system  B ς . 
Such a vector of probabilities can also be calculated using financial incentives from the 
reformed tax and benefit system,  R ς : 
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The difference in these predicted probabilities between the base and reform tax and benefit 
systems represents the effect of the reform on this particular individual/couple. The effect of the 
reform on transition probabilities can be represented as: 
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These sample-level estimates are then grossed up to the population level using FRS grossing 
factors, which are matched to the LFS in the same way as financial incentives. This procedure 
compensates for any attrition in the LFS sample. 
4.1  Short- and long-term effects of labour market reforms 
The initial results from the policy simulation give the predicted changes in transition rates 
between labour market states over the same period that the data is taken from, i.e. over one year, 
from the 1
st to the 5
th quarter of the LFS. These results are unlikely to be comparable with 
simulations from structural models since unlike the latter they are unlikely to correspond to 
long-run equilibrium effects of policies. The most natural notion of equilibrium in our 
transitions approach is that of a state in which the number of persons entering and exiting 
employment is the same. Using this definition we can derive such labour market equilibriums 
under base and reform financial incentive levels and the difference in employment levels 
between these could be treated as the full equilibrium policy effect.  
This approach relies on two assumptions: 
1)  that equilibrium can be generated as a result of a Markov transition process, i.e. that the 
observed transition rates between employment states in the most recent period of the 
initial data are ‘equilibrium’ rates, such that in the absence of changes to financial 
incentives, they would persist indefinitely into the future (and are not affected by moves 
of individuals in and out of employment); and  
2)  that changes in financial incentives induced by policy changes will produce a permanent 
change in transition rates.  
The Markov transition-process assumption is rather strong, as it implies that compositional 
changes do not affect the transition rates. Nevertheless, as can be seen in the policy simulation 
presented in section 6.4 (and as other simulations using the model confirm), the equilibrium is 
reached very quickly (after only about 5-6 iterations), which in our view makes the assumption 
weaker and justifies our approach.  
The remainder of this section shows how these assumptions can be used to derive long-run 
equilibrium stocks of persons in different labour market states, and the effects of changes in 
financial incentives on those long-run stocks.  
4.1.1  Calculations for single persons 
Denoting the (grossed up) stock of working single persons at time t as 
s
t W , the stock of non-
working persons as 
s
t U and the total stock of (working age) single persons as 
s
t N , changes in 
the stocks of the employed and non-employed over each time period are captured by the 
formulae: 
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where  ) Pr( 1 + t exit  is the probability that a person who is single leaves work by time (t+1) 
conditional on their being in work at time (t), and  ) Pr( 1 + t entry  is the probability that a single 
person enters work by time (t+1) conditional on their not being in work at time (t). If we assume 
that the total working age population of singles, 
s
t N , is stable over time, we can define long-run TAX AND BENEFIT REFORMS IN A MODEL OF LABOUR MARKET TRANSITIONS | 15 
 
equilibrium employment as 
s s
k t
s
t W W W * = = + , for all k , and likewise for 
s U*  and 
s N* . The 
probabilities of entry and exit,  ) Pr( * entry  and  ) Pr( * exit , are also constant over time in this 
equilibrium. The long-run stocks can be calculated according to the formula: 
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with 
s s s W N U * * * − = . 
In the policy simulation, a tax and benefit reform R  produces a new set of entry and exit 
predictions (call them  ) Pr( *
R entry  and  ) Pr( *
R exit ). These are plugged into equation (25) to 
produce new long-run employment predictions.  
4.1.2  Calculations for couples 
For couples, the formulae are more complicated owing to the fact that we are analysing 
transitions to and from four labour market states rather than two, but the basic principle is the 
same. Denoting the stocks at time (t) as 
c
t WW = stock of couples with both partners working; 
c
t WU = stock of couples with a man working and woman not working; 
c
t UW = stock of couples with a man not working and woman working; 
c
t UU = stock of couples with both partners not working; and  
the total couples population as 
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13 In the bivariate probit each of these probabilities is derived from the individual transition probabilities 
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Using this notation, the number of two-earner couples at time (t+1) can therefore be calculated 
as in the equation: 
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   (26) 
where the first term on the right-hand side is the number of couples who remain two-earner 
couples at time (t), the second and third terms are the number of couples moving from one 
earner to two-earner couples, and the third term represents the number of couples moving from 
no-earner to two-earner couples. In a similar way we can calculate the number of couples at 
time (t+1) in each of the four employment states.  
For the long-run changes, the notational conventions for the stocks are as for single persons, e.g. 
c c
k t
c
t WW WW WW * = = + . The equilibrium transition probabilities are denoted as 
) | Pr( ) | ( Pr 1
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k t UU WW UU WW + + + =  for all k, and likewise for all 16 transition 
probabilities. The equations for the long-run stocks for the example of two-earner couples are:  
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and similarly we can derive the long-run equilibrium stocks for the other employment states. 
The fact that there are four labour market states involved for couples instead of the two that we 
have for singles means that the long-run stocks of couples in each labour market state cannot be 
directly computed analytically; however, it is easy to calculate the long-run equilibrium stocks 
iteratively.  
4.1.3   Estimating the significance of the employment effects using a bootstrap procedure 
From the point of view of the policy-maker it is important to know whether the simulated 
employment effects are statistically significant once we account for the precision of estimation. 
We do this by bootstrapping the simulated employment response. Each estimation results in a 
vector of coefficients β ˆ  and an estimate of the variance-covariance matrix Ω ˆ . To account for 
the precision of estimation, the simulations need to use not only the mean values of β ˆ , but also 
the information contained in Ω ˆ . Simulation bootstrapping relies on repeating the reform 
simulation K number of times (where K is at least several hundred), each time with a different 
set of coefficients 
k β ˆ , where 
Ω + =
ˆ ˆ ˆ
k
k ε β β              ( 2 8 )  
Each 
k β ˆ  is a sum of the estimated vector of coefficients and a vector of estimation errors 
drawn with replacement from the estimation error distribution with mean zero and variance-
covariance matrix Ω ˆ . With a large number of draws from this distribution and a corresponding 
number of simulations, the distribution of simulated employment response will allow the 
determination of confidence intervals on the simulations and identify the statistically significant 
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5.  Data for estimation 
The modelling process relies on the use of two datasets: the LFS the FRS. This section presents 
some information on the datasets and the basic descriptive statistics. We begin with the 
description of the definition of ‘disability’ used in this study and the comparison of disability 
information as reported in the two data sources.  
5.1 Definition  of  disability 
We rely on two sources of data on disability to identify disabled persons. These are: 
1)  data on self-reported work-limiting disability status; and 
2)  data on the receipt of any disability-related benefits.  
Defining disability in this way ensures that: 
•  The definition is consistent across the two datasets – both datasets include questions on 
work-limiting disability and on benefit claim. 
•  Information on which the disability definition is based does not directly relate to 
employment status, so the definition covers those in and out of work. 
•  The ‘disabled’ defined in this way include all claimants of disability benefits; this is 
important from the perspective of reform simulations and ensures that any modelled 
reform to disability benefits will only affect individuals who are defined as ‘disabled’ in 
the model.  
Table 4 presents some basic information on the proportion of disabled persons in the FRS and 
the LFS. Depending on the dataset and the precise definition, this proportion varies between 
about 16% and 18%. 
Table 4. Disabled persons in the LFS and FRS samples (%) 
Data year  Share of persons who report 
limitations concerning the 
amount or type of work they do 
 
...and/or claim disability 
benefits 
  FRS  sample LFS  sample FRS  sample LFS  sample 
1999-00  15.5 16.7 17.0 17.9 
2000-01  16.5 16.7 18.0 17.8 
2001-02  15.1 16.5 16.6 17.7 
2002-03  15.7 18.4 17.3 19.5 
Total    15.7 17.1 17.2 18.2 
Sources: Authors’ calculations on the basis of the FRS 1999-00 to 2002-03 and the LFS Spring 1999 to 
Winter 2002 (only the final wave from each survey); complete samples; fiscal (FRS) years 
correspond to waves: spring-winter in the LFS. 
 
Turning to the data on benefit receipt, we would expect that since the eligibility criteria for all 
disability benefits include a form of disability test, most individuals claiming disability benefits 
would have limitations in terms of the type or amount of work they can do. This is not always 
the case, however. Having a disability benefit claim does not always correspond to an 
affirmative answer to questions concerning work limitations. To ensure the consistency of the 
study’s definition of disability we thus extend our definition of disability to also include the 
benefit claimants who say they are not limited in the amount or type of work they can (could) 
do. The difference between columns 2 and 4 (for the FRS) and columns 3 and 5 (for the LFS) in 18 | MYCK & REED
 
 
Table 4 is the proportion of persons who claim a disability benefit and yet do not declare work-
limiting disability in the FRS and LFS samples respectively.  
Self-reported disability may be problematic owing to the endogeneity of the response to this 
question with respect to labour market status, as documented in earlier work on this issue (e.g. 
Parsons, 1982 and Bound, 1991). From a purely analytical point of view, it would have been 
better to use an objective measure of disability, based for example on a medical test, but such 
information does not exist in the data available to us. Nevertheless, the questions on which we 
base the disability definition are asked of all surveyed individuals and are not directly linked to 
work status. Moreover, as we saw above, the modelling of disability-related financial incentives 
is largely based on the disability-benefit claim information actually reported in the data, which 
should ensure that the financial incentives arising through disability-related benefits and tax 
credits are handled correctly in the modelling process.  
5.2 Sample  selection 
The following selection criteria have been applied to the LFS and FRS samples. In the LFS and 
the FRS we exclude: 
•  full-time students; 
•  observations with key information missing or inconsistent;  
•  the self-employed; 
•  individuals aged less than 20 and more than 55;
14 and 
•  individuals who change their marital/co-habiting status between times (t-1) and (t) in the 
LFS panel. 
The FRS data covers the years 1999-2000 to 2002-03. Corresponding to this is an LFS dataset 
from spring 1998 to winter 2002. In the LFS we only use the observations for which we have 
information from wave 1 (corresponding to (t-1) in the model) and wave 5 (corresponding to (t) 
in the model).  
5.3  Employment transitions in the LFS 
One of the key issues addressed in this paper is the examination of employment transitions by 
disability status. Here we present entry and exit rates from the LFS for those who are and who 
are not disabled at time (t-1) by marital status, gender, age and whether or not they have 
children. Note that at this stage this is purely descriptive. 
The LFS data presented in Table 5 confirm that individuals who are disabled are less likely to 
enter the labour market if they are not employed and are more likely to exit a year after being 
observed as an employee. The entry rate among disabled women is four times lower than among 
non-disabled women, and disabled men are eight times less likely to enter work than non-
disabled men. Exit rates are about three times higher for disabled persons than for non-disabled 
persons. Exit rates of men are lower for those living in couples, while entry rates are slightly 
higher for single men than for those living in couples. Entry rates are higher for single women 
than for women in couples. Having a child reduces entry and increases labour market exit. As 
                                                      
14 Age restrictions are slightly different for the intermediate models, which also include individuals over 
the age of 55 and still of working age (i.e. younger than 64 for men and 60 for women). This improves the 
identification of the models. Including individuals close to retirement age makes the identification of the 
effect of financial incentives on transitions very difficult, given that the FRS does not allow us to model 
the financial incentives individuals encounter to retire early (because, for example, it contains little 
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far as age effects are concerned, it is generally the case that labour market mobility reduces with 
age – individuals in higher age groups have a lower probability of entering and lower 
probability exiting.  
Table 5. Entry and exit rates by gender, age, family characteristics and disability status (%) 
 Total  Men  Women 
Exit      
Overall exit rate  3.44  4.03  2.70 
   Age group 20-30  4.05  4.77  3.14 
   Age group 31-42  3.27  4.07  2.32 
   Age group 53-54  3.09  3.32  2.79 
   Disabled  8.83  9.85  7.65 
   Non-disabled  3.11  3.69  2.39 
   Single individuals  4.12  4.18  4.05 
   Individuals in couples  3.05  3.94  1.97 
   Have children  4.02  4.90  3.07 
Entry      
Overall entry rate  18.93  21.89  17.22 
   Age group 20-30  29.26  38.07  24.22 
   Age group 31-42  17.39  18.78  16.79 
   Age group 53-54  11.66  12.74  10.79 
   Disabled  5.67  5.37  5.95 
   Non-disabled  28.92  43.56  23.29 
   Single individuals  19.42  22.61  16.75 
   Individuals in couples  18.36  20.45  17.62 
   Have children  16.78  19.62  16.27 
Source: Authors’ calculations on the basis of the LFS Spring 1999 to Winter 2002 (panels starting from spring 1998 
to spring 1999 and ending at winter 2001 to winter 2002). 
 
6. Results 
In this section we present details of the estimation and simulation results from what we judge to 
be the best specification of the model. The results include both the singles and the couples 
models and simulations are conducted separately for singles and couples and then jointly for the 
whole sample (see section 4.2). As above we conduct a simulation bootstrap to check the 
statistical significance of the predicted employment effects. To account for the disability status 
of individuals in the sample the models include a set of disability controls. This is important to 
better understand how disability affects employment but also to minimise the effect of 
endogeneity of disability status with respect to employment. We allow for different responses to 
financial incentives by non-disabled persons without children, non-disabled persons with 
children and the disabled.  
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Given better identification and higher precision of the estimated coefficients and of the 
simulated employment effects we impose a priori restrictions in terms of which financial 
incentive variables enter the model. Each partner’s entry and exit can be directly influenced 
solely by income in the (t-1) employment state and in the state in which s/he can move, 
assuming the other partner remains in the original state. Indirectly, however, the move is also 
determined by the financial incentives the other partner faces in the alternative to which s/he can 
move between (t-1) and (t). 
In section 6.1 we present a list of variables included in the regressions for single persons and 
couples. A summary of the results is presented in section 6.2, while the appendix contains 
details of the estimations. Finally, in section 6.3 we present the results of policy simulations 
using the model. The simulations include an exercise whereby we simulate the employment 
response to a small net income change (the same for all individuals and couples). This facilitates 
greater understanding of the sensitivity of various groups of individuals to changes in financial 
incentives that are implied by the model. Given the nonlinear nature of the models, the degree of 
this sensitivity is difficult to judge purely on the basis of estimated coefficients or marginal 
effects. As noted in the introduction, the policy reform we choose to simulate using our model is 
the introduction of the WFTC. 
6.1  Regressors in the transition models 
For single persons we include financial incentive variables in the form of logarithms of 
predicted income in work and out of work. Income measures are split into separate regressor 
variables in order to allow differential effects of financial incentives by three categories of 
individuals:  
•  disabled persons (denoted as D in the results presented in Tables 7-10); 
•  non-disabled persons with children (denoted as C, ND); and 
•  non-disabled persons without children (denoted as NC, ND). 
Apart from the financial incentive variables, the preferred specification for single individuals 
uses the regressor variables listed in Table 6. It is important to stress here that, following Gregg, 
Johnson & Reed (1999), we exclude education controls from the transition models. This 
decision follows from difficulties involved with identifying the model when education 
information enters transition equations, which most probably derives from a very high 
correlation of net incomes and education level. This in a sense implies an exclusion restriction. 
Education in the model determines the financial incentive variables, but is then assumed not to 
affect transitions. The same assumption was made in the original Gregg, Johnson & Reed 
(1999) model. 
The models for couples include essentially the same control variables as those listed in Table 6, 
but in the case of each partner’s equation in the bivariate probit we include controls for the 
characteristics of the other partner. For example, in each of the equations we control for the age 
and the disability status of both the man and the woman. In each equation we have a variable for 
the net income in the employment state at time (t-1) and then net income in the employment 
state that results from the entry or exit of the respective partner. Because we allow for 
differentiated responses to financial incentives (as in the singles’ model), each equation contains 
six financial incentive variables.  
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Table 6. Regressors in the transition models 
Age  Linear, squared and cubic terms 
Disability 
status 
Because disability status can change across LFS waves, we include indicator 
variables for each combination of individual disability at LFS wave 1 (t-1) and at 
LFS wave 5 (t). That is, taking non-disability at (t-1) and (t) as the base category, we 
have dummies for:  
  not disabled at (t-1), disabled at (t); 
  disabled at (t-1), not disabled at (t); and 
  disabled at (t-1) and at (t). 
Disability 
type 
We control for the type of disability by including two dummies for the health 
problem that affects the individual most: 
  mental disability; and 
  sight/hearing/speech impediment. 
We also include a dummy for receipt of the DLA at time (t-1) as a proxy control for 
severity of disability. 
Number and 
ages of 
children 
We include indicator variables for: 
  having a child at all or not;  
  having two or more children; 
  presence of a child aged less than 5; and 
  presence of a newborn baby. 
Other dummy 
variables 
We include indicator variables for: 
  data years; 
  being a woman; 
  being a woman and having a child; 
  living in London/South East; 
  being unemployed as defined by the International Labour Organisation 
   (ILO) at (t-1) (entry model only); and 
  being ILO long-term unemployed at (t-1) (entry model only). 
Source: Authors’ data. 
 
6.2  Major findings in the final specification of the transition models for 
singles 
This section discusses the main findings from the estimations of the transition models for single 
persons. The results are summarised in Table 7 below.  
6.2.1  The singles’ entry model 
The left-hand column of Table 7 shows the results from estimating the model on a sample of 
single persons who were unemployed or inactive in the labour market at LFS wave 1, where the 
dependent variable is entry into work by LFS wave 5 – the ‘entry model’.  
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Table 7. Main model results: Single persons 
Regressors   Entry equation (dependent 
variable: work entry) 
Exit equation (dependent 
variable: work exit) 
   Coeff.  s.e.    Coeff.  s.e.   
Year 2000    -0.0131  (0.0516)    -0.1103  (0.0426)  ** 
Year  2001   0.0079 (0.0533)  -0.1048 (0.0432)  ** 
Year  2002   0.0584 (0.0534)  -0.0480 (0.0419)  
Age   -0.2500  (0.0921)  ***  -0.1232  (0.0782)   
Age squared    0.0063  (0.0026)  **  0.0022  (0.0022)   
Age  cubed   -0.0001 (0.0000)  ** 0.0000 (0.0000)  
Has  a  child   0.1537 (0.1740)  -0.4618 (0.1670)  *** 
Has 2+ children    -0.1026  (0.0834)    0.0853  (0.1040)   
Has child aged <5    -0.2653  (0.0644)  ***  0.2317  (0.0799)  *** 
Newborn   -0.2180  (0.1456)    0.6095  (0.1531)  *** 
Woman with a child    0.2869  (0.1357)  **  -0.0835  (0.1121)   
Woman without a child    0.1770  (0.0585)  ***  -0.2458  (0.0413)  *** 
Lives  in  London/SE   0.0591 (0.0438)   0.0330 (0.0377)  
Disabled (t-1, t)    2.0264  (1.1562)  *  -2.1688  (0.8990)  ** 
Disabled (t) only    1.9628  (1.1559)  *  -1.8977  (0.8935)  ** 
Disabled (t-1) only    0.2862  (0.0836)  ***  0.0194  (0.0906)   
Mental dis. (t-1)    -0.2324  (0.0863)  ***  0.3725  (0.1270)  *** 
Sight/hearing/speech dis. (t-1)    -0.0150  (0.1594)    -0.2419  (0.1419)  * 
DLA receipt (t-1)    -0.3323  (0.1016) *** -0.0547  (0.1433)   
ILO unemployed (t-1)    0.7960  (0.0469)  ***  –  –   
LTU (t-1)    -0.6670  (0.0645)  ***  –  –   
Ln (inc 0) NC, ND    -0.3780  (0.1336)  ***  0.0535  (0.1460)   
Ln (inc 1) NC, ND    0.6287  (0.1577)  ***  -0.1833  (0.1164)   
Ln (inc 0) C, ND    -1.0526  (0.3751)  ***  0.7864  (0.2025)  *** 
Ln (inc 1) C, ND    1.1940  (0.3649)  ***  -0.7150  (0.1885)  *** 
Ln (inc 0) D    -0.3907  (0.1905)  **  0.8275  (0.1355)  *** 
Ln (inc 1) D    0.1219  (0.2490)    -0.2943  (0.1459)  ** 
Constant   0.8359 (1.1326)   0.9898 (0.8620)  
No. observations    8878  23108 
Log likelihood    -2955.74  -3887.15 
*** significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10% 
Notes:   Ln (inc 0) – log income out of work; LN (inc 1) – log income at work; NC – does not have children, ND – not disabled (at 
t), D – disabled (at t); LTU – long-term unemployed; FI – financial incentives 
Mental disability (at (t-1)) is either depression/bad nerves/anxiety or mental illness/phobia/panics/nervous disorders 
Sight/hearing/speech disability (at (t-1)) is either difficulty with sight, hearing or speech impediment 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
If movements into work are more likely among individuals with larger gains to work (other 
things being equal), then we would expect to find the coefficients on the income out-of-work 
(inc 0) variables to be negative (because higher out-of-work income is likely to be negatively 
correlated with the propensity to enter work), and that the coefficient on income in-work (inc 1) 
variables should be positive (individuals are more likely to enter work if their income in work is 
higher). In Table 7, this pattern exists for all three groups (disabled, non-disabled parents and 
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statistically significant for disabled persons. The age coefficients imply that there is a negative 
relationship between age and the propensity to enter work, but the relationship is non-linear. 
Single persons aged below 30 are notably more likely to enter work, other things being equal, 
than those aged over 30. Between the ages of 30 and 50 the probability of entering work is 
roughly constant, but above 50 it falls quite sharply. The variables of having a child and having 
more than two children are not statistically significant, which suggests that most of the effects 
of children on work entry are captured by the different financial incentives encountered by 
parents, and the fact that parents respond differently to financial incentives than non-parents. 
Having a child aged under five is, however, significantly negatively related to work entry even 
after controlling for financial incentives. The indicator for being a woman shows that, other 
things being equal, single women are more likely to enter work than single men, particularly if 
they have children. This may reflect the fact that the employment rate of lone mothers was 
increasing relative to other groups in the labour market over this period.  
The indicators for disability indicate, perhaps surprisingly, that disabled single persons are more 
likely to enter work than non-disabled single persons controlling for other factors (including the 
impact of financial incentives in the out-of-work state, which is more negative for the disabled 
than the non-disabled. Still, these dummies are only marginally statistically significant with the 
exception of disability at (t-1). In this case, however, it is plausible that someone who was 
disabled at (t-1) and is not at time (t) may be more likely to enter than someone who is not 
disabled at both the periods.
15 The dummy variable for mental disability suggests that 
individuals with mental disabilities are less likely to enter work. Similarly, those who receive 
the DLA at (t-1) are also less likely to be in work at (t). The unemployed as defined by the 
International Labour Organisation (ILO) are, unsurprisingly, more likely to enter employment, 
although the effect is smaller for those who have been jobless for more than a year at (t-1). 
6.2.2  The singles’ exit model 
The most right-hand column of Table 7 gives the results from a probit equation estimated on the 
sample of single persons in work at LFS wave 1, where the dependent variable is leaving work 
by LFS wave 5 – the ‘exit model’.  
In the exit equation, we would expect the financial incentive variables to have the opposite sign 
to what we would expect in the entry equation. That is, we would expect the coefficients on the 
inc 1 (income in work) variables to be negative and the coefficients on inc 0 to be positive. As 
with the entry model, this is what we do find, but the effects are only statistically significant for 
disabled persons and non-disabled persons with children.  
The relation between age and exit probability, conditional on other factors, is much weaker than 
it was for the entry model. The linear age term is significant (and negative) only at the 10% 
level, and the quadratic and cubic terms not at all. Having a child is negatively associated with 
leaving work conditional on other factors, but having a child aged 5 or under is positively 
associated with leaving work, as is having a baby born between wave 1 and wave 5 of the LFS. 
Women without children are significantly less likely to leave work than men without children, 
conditional on other factors.  
In terms of the impact of disability variables, the disability dummies themselves are positive and 
statistically significant. Yet individuals who declared mental disability as their main health 
problem at (t-1) are more likely to exit work between (t-1) and (t), while those who have 
problems with sight, hearing or speech problems are less likely to exit than other disabled 
persons. This is an interesting and important finding. It may reflect the fact that persons who 
                                                      
15 This type of relationship would of course be observed if disability was endogenous to work status 
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have such problems enjoy some special employment protection or when they do find work they 
put extra effort towards maintaining it. At the same time, the interaction between financial 
incentives and disability acts to reinforce the effects of financial incentives.  
6.3  Major findings in the final specification of the transition models for 
couples 
The discussion of results in this section refers to estimations presented in Tables 8 to 11 below. 
The couples regressions are estimated by bivariate probit. This means that there are two sets of 
coefficients in every regression – one for the male partner and one for the female partner. The 
model also estimates the degree of correlation between the decisions of partners (the statistical 
significance of this correlation is measured by the statistical significance of either ‘rho’ or 
‘arthrho’, the latter being a transformation of rho used in the estimation).  
6.3.1  Transitions of individuals in (0,0) couples 
Table 8 shows the results for the model for couples wherein neither partner is in work in LFS 
wave 1 (time (t-1)). We now have six sets of coefficients on the financial incentive variable: 
disabled, non-disabled parents and non-disabled non-parents, for men and women separately. 
If individuals are more likely to enter work when the financial reward is greater, then we would 
intuitively expect a negative coefficient on the (0,0) incomes, and positive coefficients on the 
(1,0) or (0,1) incomes. In fact, we find this pattern only for disabled men, disabled women and 
non-disabled mothers, and the coefficients on financial incentive variables are only statistically 
significant for disabled men. 
Men who are disabled in both LFS waves or only in the later LFS wave are less likely to enter 
work than other groups. On top of this, men with partners who are disabled in both LFS waves 
are less likely to enter work. This may be because of caring responsibilities for the partner, for 
example. Women who are disabled in both waves are less likely to move into work than other 
women, but the man’s disability does not affect the woman’s work entry to any measurable 
extent. The severity of disability as measured by the DLA-receipt indicator variable is 
negatively related to men’s entry.  
Having a child aged less than five and a newborn baby is associated with being less likely to 
move into work for women. The other children variables are not significant for either men or 
women once financial incentives are taken into account. Interestingly, women in couples in this 
starting state are less likely to move into work by wave 5 if they live in London or the South 
East, conditional on other factors.  
The model confirms an intuitive association of unemployment with the probability to enter. 
Being ILO unemployed (i.e. looking for work and being prepared to take a job) is positively 
correlated with entry for both men and women. Remaining unemployed for over a year, 
however, reduces the probability of entering relative to the other unemployed. Finally, we find a 
positive and statistically significant correlation between the labour market decisions of partners. 
A positive correlation in this model indicates that there is a tendency for both partners to want to 
choose the same labour market status. 
6.3.2  Transitions of individuals in (0,1) couples 
Table 9 shows the results of the couples model for the group in which the man was not working 
in LFS wave 1, but the woman was – i.e. starting state (0,1). This is the least common of the 
four starting states for a couple, so sample sizes are small and the coefficients are not precisely 
estimated. We also suspect that this group contains a number of cases whereby the man in the 
couple has been temporarily displaced from work, which should be borne in mind when 
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Table 8. Results for couples – Neither working at wave 1 (0,0)  
  Men entry  Women entry 
Year 2000  0.1816  (0.1415)    0.0738  (0.1603)   
Year 2001  0.4613  (0.1443)  ***  0.1729  (0.1654)   
Year 2002  -0.0108  (0.1572)    0.3267  (0.1607)  ** 
Age, M  -0.2514  (0.3574)    0.4195  (0.4416)   
Age squared, M  0.0067  (0.0096)    -0.0095  (0.0116)   
Age cubed, M  -0.0001  (0.0001)    0.0001  (0.0001)   
Age, W  -0.2622  (0.3128)    -0.1131  (0.3431)   
Age squared, W  0.0071  (0.0087)    0.0020  (0.0095)   
Age cubed, W  -0.0001  (0.0001)    0.0000  (0.0001)   
Disabled, M (t-1, t)  -0.6370  (0.1730)  ***  -0.1866  (0.2664)   
Disabled, M (t only)  -0.6859  (0.2375)  ***  0.1061  (0.3113)   
Disabled, M (t-1 only)  0.2607  (0.2335)    -0.2742  (0.3416)   
Disabled, W (t-1, t)  -0.4222  (0.1810)  **  -0.7862  (0.2032)  *** 
Disabled, W (t-1 only)  -0.5137  (0.2800)  *  0.2192  (0.2383)   
Disabled, W (t only)  -0.2540  (0.2195)    -0.3473  (0.2302)   
Mental dis. M (t-1)  -0.3977  (0.3078)    0.0370  (0.2439)   
Mental dis. W (t-1)  -0.0148  (0.2415)    0.0536  (0.3061)   
Sight/hearing/speech dis. M (t-1)  0.2619  (0.4078)    0.0199  (0.4789)   
Sight/hearing/speech dis. W (t-1)  –  –    0.4992  (0.6308)   
DLA receipt M (t-1)  -0.9763  (0.3939) ** 0.1192 (0.1841)   
DLA receipt W (t-1)  0.1429  (0.1976)  -0.1734  (0.2958)  
Children (one or two)  -0.0395  (0.1801)    -0.3062  (0.2166)   
Children three+  0.0911  (0.2329)    -0.4782  (0.2887)  * 
Have child aged <5  0.1163  (0.1652)    -0.2003  (0.1941)   
Newborn -0.0891  (0.2245)    -0.9897  (0.4608)  ** 
Live in London/SE  0.0739  (0.1406)    -0.3145  (0.1757)  * 
ILO unemployed M (t-1)  1.0170  (0.1324)  ***  0.2743  (0.1711)   
LTU, M (t-1)  -0.8157  (0.1439)  ***  -0.2895  (0.1825)   
ILO unemployed W (t-1)  0.1767  (0.1844)    0.7400  (0.1796)  *** 
LTU, W (t-1)  -0.0762  (0.3888)    -0.5148  (0.3709)   
Ln(inc 0,0) ND, NC  -0.2285  (0.4762)    0.0893  (0.7605)   
Ln(inc 0,1) ND, NC  –  –    -0.1672  (0.7801)   
Ln(inc 1,0) ND, NC  -0.0841  (0.4694)    –  –   
Ln(inc 1,1) ND, NC  –  –    –  –   
Ln(inc 0,0) D  -1.1987  (0.3829)  ***  -0.2796  (0.6777)   
Ln(inc 0,1) D  –  –    0.1271  (0.7008)   
Ln(inc 1,0) D  0.7902  (0.3865)  **  –  –   
Ln(inc 1,1) D  –  –    –  –   
Ln(inc 0,0) ND, C  -0.1878  (0.2948)    -0.3753  (0.3928)   
Ln(inc 0,1) ND, C  –  –    0.2998  (0.4853)   
Ln(inc 1,0) ND, C  -0.1421  (0.3157)    –  –   
Ln(inc 1,1) ND, C  –  –    –  –   
Constant 7.0525  (4.5473)    -4.2530  (5.7147)   
Athrho 0.4296  (0.0949)  ***  –  –   
Rho 0.4050  –    –  –   
No. observations  1502  –  –   
Log likelihood  -681.04  –  –   
Notes for Tables 8-11: *** significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 10%; Ln (inc 0,0) – log income when both 
partners are out of work; Ln (inc 0,1) – log income when only women are working; Ln (inc 1,0) – log income when only men are 
working; Ln (inc 1,1) – log income when both partners work; 
NC – no children, ND – not disabled (at t); D – disabled (at t) is disability defined on the level of the couple (i.e. disabled if at 
least one partner disabled); 
Disability type defined using information on the health problem that affects the person most: mental disability (at (t-1)) is either 
depression/bad nerves/anxiety or mental illness/phobia/panics/nervous disorders; sight/hearing/speech disability (at (t-1)) is either 
difficulty with sight, hearing or speech impediments; 
LTU – long-term unemployed; M – man; W – woman; Rho – measure of correlation between the men’s and the women’s 
equations; Athrho – a transformation of rho, which is used in the estimation of bivariate probit 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 26 | MYCK & REED
 
 
Table 9. Results for couples – Woman only working at wave 1 (0,1) 
  Specification 2 
  Men entry  Women exit 
Year  2000  -0.0221  (0.1426)   0.2160  (0.2020)  
Year 2001  -0.0298  (0.1559)    0.3681  (0.2042)  * 
Year  2002  -0.0612  (0.1578)   0.3258  (0.2115)  
Age,  M  -0.7146  (0.6349)   0.4189  (0.7547)  
Age squared, M  0.0157  (0.0157)    -0.0084  (0.0190)   
Age cubed, M  -0.0001  (0.0001)    0.0001  (0.0002)   
Age,  W  0.3147  (0.4724)  -0.6102  (0.5898)  
Age squared, W  -0.0074  (0.0124)    0.0142  (0.0156)   
Age cubed, W  0.0001  (0.0001)    -0.0001  (0.0001)   
Disabled, M (t-1, t)  -0.3995  (0.2870)    0.0079  (0.3185)   
Disabled, M (t only)  -0.5653 (0.3843)   0.7414  (0.4019)  * 
Disabled, M (t-1 only)  0.0277  (0.2436)  -0.6203  (0.5239)  
Disabled, W (t-1, t)  0.2210  (0.2459)   1.0863  (0.2403)  *** 
Disabled, W (t-1 only)  0.0159  (0.2815)   0.4041  (0.3109)  
Disabled, W (t only)  0.2897  (0.2705)   0.9327  (0.2637)  *** 
Mental dis. M (t-1)  -0.4832  (0.3286)    -0.1187  (0.3467)   
Mental dis. W (t-1)  0.1611  (0.5350)   0.4626  (0.5393)  
Sight/hearing/speech dis. M (t-1)  -0.7610  (0.4494)  *  –  –   
Sight/hearing/speech dis. W (t-1)  0.2227  (0.5408)    -0.4536  (0.6689)   
DLA receipt M (t-1)  -0.5129  (0.2430) **  0.0008 (0.2241)   
DLA receipt W (t-1)  0.1076  (0.5380)   0.5044  (0.4756)  
Children (one or two)  0.0470  (0.1732)    -0.5422  (0.2335)  ** 
Children  three+  0.1615  (0.2800)  -0.5648  (0.3621)  
Have child aged <5  -0.6367  (0.2234)  ***  0.0089  (0.2864)   
Newborn 0.7412  (0.3890)  *  0.2535  (0.4376)   
Live  in  London/SE  0.1305  (0.1394)  -0.0278  (0.1884)  
ILO unemployed M (t-1)  1.1174  (0.1265)  ***  0.2498  (0.1976)   
LTU, M (t-1)  -0.7283  (0.1810)  ***  0.4056  (0.2390)  * 
Ln(inc 0,0) ND, NC  –  –    0.5188  (0.5099)   
Ln(inc 0,1) ND, NC  -0.8731  (0.5073)  *  0.1931  (0.4999)   
Ln(inc 1,0) ND, NC  –  –    –  –   
Ln(inc 1,1) ND, NC  0.8615  (0.5385)    –  –   
Ln(inc 0,0) D  –  –    0.3652  (0.3719)   
Ln(inc 0,1) D  -1.1339  (0.4484)  **  0.3555  (0.3983)   
Ln(inc 1,0) D  –  –    –  –   
Ln(inc 1,1) D  0.9771  (0.4708)  **  –  –   
Ln(inc 0,0) ND, C  –  –    1.4183  (0.5474)  ** 
Ln(inc 0,1) ND, C  0.6046  (0.4335)    -0.5539  (0.4737)   
Ln(inc 1,0) ND, C  –  –    –  –   
Ln(inc 1,1) ND, C  -0.5415  (0.4786)    –  –   
Constant  6.1298  (8.0064)  -3.3222  (9.7262)  
Athrho -0.1337  (0.1116)    –  –   
Rho -0.1329  –    –  –   
No. observations  1014  –  –   
Log likelihood  -594.04  –  –   
Notes: See notes for Table 8. 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
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If individuals are more likely to enter work and less likely to leave work, the larger is the pay-
off from working; thus we would expect the coefficients on the financial incentive variables to 
be positive on the income (1,1) state for men and on the income (0,0) state for women, and to be 
negative on the income (0,1) state for men and on the income (0,1) state for women. We find 
this pattern for three of the six groups: disabled men, non-disabled mothers and non-disabled 
non-parent men; the financial incentive variables are only statistically significant for disabled 
men and non-disabled mothers. 
Analysis of the age variables shows that they are not a significant determinant of either men’s 
entry into work or women’s work exit. Neither partner’s labour market transitions are affected 
by the woman’s age.  
The disability of women is positively related to their exit, and partners of disabled men only in 
period (t) are also more likely to exit work. Men with sight, speech or hearing problems and 
those receiving the DLA are less likely to enter employment, as are those with a child aged less 
than 5 (though men with a newborn baby are in fact more likely to enter employment). 
Conditional on other factors, women’s exit probability is lower for those with children.  
The correlation between the labour market decisions of partners is negative, but not statistically 
significant. A negative correlation in this model indicates that there is a tendency for both 
partners to want to choose the same labour market status. 
6.3.3  Transitions of individuals in (1,0) couples 
Table 10 gives results for the case in which the couples’ starting state is (1,0) – i.e. the man in 
the couple is in work but the woman is not at LFS wave 1. This is far more common in the data 
than the starting state (0,1).  
If individuals are more likely to enter work, and less likely to leave work, the larger is the pay-
off from working; thus in this model we would expect the coefficients on the financial incentive 
variables to be positive on the income (1,1) state for women and on the income (0,0) state for 
men, and to be negative on the income (0,1) state for women and on the income (0,1) state for 
men. This pattern can be found for disabled men and women, non-disabled fathers and women 
who are neither disabled nor parents; the financial incentive variables are significantly different 
from zero, although only for the disabled men and women. 
It is only for men that the disability dummies for disability at both (t-1) and (t) and disability at 
(t) are statistically significant and have the expected signs. For women, disability at both periods 
(t-1) and (t) and at period (t) is negatively correlated with entry while disability at period (t-1) is 
only positively correlated with entry. Women’s severe disability, as measured by the receipt of 
DLA at (t-1) is negatively correlated with entry. Having small children is also negatively 
correlated with women’s propensity to enter employment.  
The correlation between partners’ decisions is negative but not statistically significant. Thus 
again the correlation between partners’ decisions indicates that there is a tendency for both 
partners to want to choose the same labour market status. 
6.3.4  Transitions of individuals in (1,1) couples 
Finally, Table 11 gives the results for the case in which the couples’ starting state is (1,1) – i.e. 
both the man and woman are working in LFS wave 1. If couples are less likely to leave work 
because they receive a large financial reward for working, then the coefficients on (1,1) income 
should be negative and the coefficients on the other income states should be positive. We 
observe this pattern for disabled men and women, mothers and non-disabled women without 
children, and they are significantly different from zero for disabled men and women and non-
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Table 10. Results for couples – Man only working at wave 1 (1,0) 
  Specification 2 
  Men exit  Women entry 
Year 2000  -0.0586  (0.0874)    -0.0152  (0.0532)   
Year 2001  -0.0346  (0.0900)    -0.0534  (0.0566)   
Year 2002  0.0338  (0.0866)    -0.0943  (0.0565)  * 
Age, M  -0.3274  (0.2751)    0.0935  (0.1946)   
Age squared, M  0.0081  (0.0072)    -0.0025  (0.0050)   
Age cubed, M  -0.0001  (0.0001)    0.0000  (0.0000)   
Age, W  -0.3616  (0.2372)    0.1219  (0.1617)   
Age squared, W  0.0083  (0.0064)    -0.0030  (0.0044)   
Age cubed, W  -0.0001  (0.0001)    0.0000  (0.0000)   
Disabled, M (t-1, t)  0.6341  (0.1395)  ***  -0.2830  (0.1612)  * 
Disabled, M (t only)  0.7600  (0.1415) *** -0.1233  (0.1559)   
Disabled, M (t-1 only)  0.2572 (0.1666)  0.0315  (0.1217)   
Disabled, W (t-1, t)  0.0317  (0.1539)  -0.7750  (0.1621) *** 
Disabled, W (t-1 only)  0.2522 (0.1635)  0.1881  (0.1051)  * 
Disabled, W (t only)  0.2218  (0.1745)  -0.6804  (0.1764) *** 
Mental dis. M (t-1)  -0.0972  (0.3887)    0.1504  (0.3421)   
Mental dis. W (t-1)  0.1358  (0.1729)  -0.1567  (0.1591)   
Sight/hearing/speech dis. M (t-1)  -0.4223  (0.3370)    0.1468  (0.1897)   
Sight/hearing/speech dis. W (t-1)  –  –    -0.2535  (0.2375)   
DLA receipt M (t-1)  0.3954  (0.3442)   0.4473  (0.3812)   
DLA receipt W (t-1)  -0.1249  (0.1478)  -0.2748  (0.1369) ** 
Children (one or two)  -0.0176  (0.1351)    0.0243  (0.1059)   
Children three+  0.1246  (0.1687)    -0.0343  (0.1170)   
Have child aged <5  0.0259  (0.0962)    -0.3734  (0.0556)  *** 
Newborn -0.0663  (0.1532)    -0.4888  (0.1046)  *** 
Live in London/SE  -0.0369  (0.0776)    -0.0165  (0.0471)   
ILO unemployed W (t-1)  0.0956  (0.1078)    1.0854  (0.0598)  *** 
LTU, W (t-1)  -0.3428  (0.3462)    -0.4660  (0.1601)  *** 
Ln(inc 0,0) ND, NC  -0.3126  (0.2427)    –  –   
Ln(inc 0,1) ND, NC  –  –    –  –   
Ln(inc 1,0) ND, NC  0.2116  (0.2167)    -0.8268  (0.5906)   
Ln(inc 1,1) ND, NC  –  –    0.8968  (0.5919)   
Ln(inc 0,0) D  0.4051  (0.1894)  **  –  –   
Ln(inc 0,1) D  –  –    –  –   
Ln(inc 1,0) D  -0.3319  (0.1782)  *  -0.8100  (0.4713)  * 
Ln(inc 1,1) D  –  –    0.9225  (0.4820)  * 
Ln(inc 0,0) ND, C  0.2489  (0.1642)    –  –   
Ln(inc 0,1) ND, C  –  –    –  –   
Ln(inc 1,0) ND, C  -0.2025  (0.1332)    0.1447  (0.4148)   
Ln(inc 1,1) ND, C  –  –    -0.0334  (0.4565)   
Constant 7.1186  (3.0618)  **  -3.6480  (2.2202)   
Athrho -0.0290  (0.0499)    –  –   
Rho -0.0290  –    –  –   
No. observations  6069  –  –   
Log likelihood  -3539.65  –  –   
Notes: See notes for Table 8. 
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Table 11. Results for couples – Both working at wave 1 (1,1) 
  Men exit  Women exit 
Year 2000  -0.0259  (0.0537)    -0.0141  (0.0409)   
Year 2001  -0.1122  (0.0571)  **  0.0330  (0.0416)   
Year 2002  0.0114  (0.0548)    0.0195  (0.0422)   
Age, M  -0.3024  (0.1933)    0.1431  (0.1514)   
Age squared, M  0.0079  (0.0050)    -0.0035  (0.0039)   
Age cubed, M  -0.0001  (0.0000)    0.0000  (0.0000)   
Age, W  -0.0642  (0.1629)    -0.0194  (0.1247)   
Age squared, W  0.0005  (0.0043)    -0.0005  (0.0034)   
Age cubed, W  0.0000  (0.0000)    0.0000  (0.0000)   
Disabled, M (t-1, t)  0.7309  (0.1457)  ***  0.1653  (0.1120)   
Disabled, M (t only)  0.6724  (0.1490)  ***  0.2259 (0.1171) * 
Disabled, M (t-1 only)  0.1312 (0.1051)    0.0600  (0.0816)   
Disabled, W (t-1, t)  -0.0839 (0.1420)    0.7823  (0.1178)  *** 
Disabled, W (t-1 only)  -0.1244  (0.1328)   0.1509 (0.0886) * 
Disabled, W (t only)  0.1780  (0.1395)   0.7105 (0.1212)  *** 
Mental dis. M (t-1)  0.5738  (0.2138)  ***  0.0100  (0.2668)   
Mental dis. W (t-1)  0.0376  (0.2762)   0.4792 (0.1500)  *** 
Sight/hearing/speech dis. M (t-1)  -0.2147  (0.1785)    0.0383  (0.1317)   
Sight/hearing/speech dis. W (t-1)  –  –    -0.1572  (0.1910)   
DLA receipt M (t-1)  0.3868  (0.2484)   0.3954 (0.2529)   
DLA receipt W (t-1)  0.2044  (0.2532)   -0.0915 (0.1731)   
Children (one or two)  0.0551  (0.0892)    -0.2094  (0.0856)  ** 
Children three+  0.0835  (0.1187)    -0.0651  (0.1014)   
Have child aged <5  0.1277  (0.0687)  *  0.4058  (0.0446)  *** 
Newborn   0.0380  (0.1085)    0.4911  (0.0536)  *** 
Live in London/SE  -0.0708  (0.0492)    0.0915  (0.0353)  ** 
Ln(inc 0,0) ND, NC  –  –    –  –   
Ln(inc 0,1) ND, NC  -0.0360  (0.3050)    –  –   
Ln(inc 1,0) ND, NC  –  –    0.9749  (0.4280)  ** 
Ln(inc 1,1) ND, NC  0.0470  (0.3097)    -0.9623  (0.3990)  ** 
Ln(inc 0,0) D  –  –    –  –   
Ln(inc 0,1) D  0.8358  (0.2320)  ***  –  –   
Ln(inc 1,0) D  –  –    0.9253  (0.3160)  *** 
Ln(inc 1,1) D  -0.7334  (0.2312)  ***  -0.9123  (0.3040)  *** 
Ln(inc 0,0) ND, C  –  –    –  –   
Ln(inc 0,1) ND, C  -0.0407  (0.2456)    –  –   
Ln(inc 1,0) ND, C  –  –    0.3020  (0.2970)   
Ln(inc 1,1) ND, C  0.0331  (0.2191)    -0.2829  (0.2914)   
Constant 2.5656  (2.1636)    -2.7938  (1.7068)   
Athrho 0.1644  (0.0390)  ***  –  –   
Rho 0.1629  –    –  –   
No. observations  25121  –  –   
Log likelihood  -6285.30  –  –   
Notes: See notes for Table 8. 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
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Disability is positively correlated with exit for both men and women. Those who have a mental 
disability are also more likely to exit than other disabled persons. The presence of children 
primarily affects women’s propensity to leave work; yet while having a small child or a 
newborn baby increases the probability of exit, having children seems to reduce the probability 
of exit conditional on other characteristics. Women living in London or the South East are more 
likely to leave employment.  
The correlation between the labour market decisions of partners is positive and statistically 
significant. A positive correlation in this model indicates that there is a tendency for both 
partners to want to choose the same labour market status. 
6.4  Simulating a policy change using the final version of the model 
The model specifications presented above are employed below to simulate the effects of 
introducing the WFTC as it was implemented in October 1999. The WFTC increased the 
generosity of in-work support for families with children in the UK by increasing the maximum 
values of support individuals could apply for and reducing the withdrawal taper of the transfer. 
As with its predecessor, the Family Credit, the WFTC was conditional on at least 16 hours of 
paid employment per week worked by at least one adult in the family and on net family 
income.
16 The reform also included changes to the generosity of childcare support and increases 
in in-work support for disabled persons (the Disabled Persons’ Tax Credit), which are modelled 
in our approach.  
We begin this section with a simulation exercise aimed at a better understanding of the degree 
of responsiveness to financial incentives by different groups of individuals and couples. This is 
done by comparing entry and exit rates in response to £1 changes in incomes in and out of work. 
Such an exercise can be useful for understanding how the model operates, since all individuals 
and all couples are treated in the same way (regardless of whether they have children or are 
disabled, and regardless of their net income) and therefore compositional effects are not so 
important for changes by group. We thus simulate changes in transition probabilities when 
weekly income in and out of work changes by £1 (approximately €1.47).
17  
The results of these simulations, conducted on the 2001 FRS/LFS data, are presented in Table 
12. The table shows several important conclusions that can be drawn on the basis of the model. 
First, the overall effect of changes in financial incentives out of work is much stronger for single 
persons than for those in couples. This also applies to changes in income in work with the 
exception of its effect on the exit rate of men in couples. In the last case the effect is about twice 
the size of the effect on single men. As far as responsiveness to changes in income by age group 
is concerned, this generally seems to be strongest for younger individuals.  
The difference in responsiveness between disabled and non-disabled persons is greatest for the 
effect of changes in out-of-work income on the exit rate. A £1 change in net income out of work 
changes the exit rate of disabled persons by 0.084 of a percentage point (about 1% of the 
                                                      
16 For details of the reform see Blundell et al. (2000), Myck (2000) or Myck et al. (2006). 
17 In the case of couples this is slightly more complex and changes in income depend on the original 
employment state the couple is in at (t-1), and on the restrictions imposed in the estimation. For couples 
(0,0) the change in income in work implies a £1 change in both (1,0) and (0,1) incomes and the change in 
income out of work implies a £2 change (£1 per person) in (0,0) income. For couples (0,1) the change in 
income in work implies a £2 change in (1,1) income and a £1 change in (0,1) income, and the change in 
income out of work implies a £2 change in (0,0) income and £1 change in (0,1) income. Similarly for 
couples (1,0) the change in income in work implies a £2 change in (1,1) income and a £1 change in (1,0) 
income, and the change in income out of work implies a £2 change in (0,0) income and £1 change in (1,0) 
income. For couples (1,1) the change in income in work implies a £2 change in incomes in both (1,1) and 
the change in income out of work implies a £1 change in (1,0) and (0,1) incomes. TAX AND BENEFIT REFORMS IN A MODEL OF LABOUR MARKET TRANSITIONS | 31 
 
baseline exit rate), while it changes the exit rate of non-disabled persons by 0.011 of a 
percentage point (0.4% of the baseline exit rate). Interestingly, although the effect of a change in 
income in work on exit rates in terms of percentage point changes is also greater for the disabled 
as a percentage of the baseline exit rates it is the same for the disabled and non-disabled.  
Table 12. Transition responsiveness – Effect of increasing income in and out of work by £1 
 Total  Men  Women 
Grossed-up population  20,991,000 10,743,000 10,248,000 
Exit sample  16,387,000 9,072,000 7,315,000 
Entry sample  4,604,000  1,671,000  2,933,000 
Disabled in exit sample 835,000  454,000  381,000 
Disabled in entry sample 1,991,000  965,000  1,026,000 
Singles in exit sample 6,015,000  3,354,000  2,662,000 
Singles in entry sample 2,510,000  1,156,000  1,354,000 
      
EXIT (in %)        
Overall exit rate  3.25  3.89  2.45 
   Age group 20-30  3.74  4.42  2.88 
   Age group 30-42  3.15  4.07  2.05 
   Age group 43-54  2.94  3.22  2.57 
   Disabled  8.45  9.09  7.70 
   Non-disabled  2.97  3.62  2.16 
   Single individuals  3.74  3.72  3.77 
   Individuals in couples  2.96  4.00  1.70 
£1 out-of-work effect on exit rates       
Overall exit rate  0.015  0.016  0.014 
   Age group 20-30  0.016  0.017  0.016 
   Age group 30-42  0.015  0.017  0.012 
   Age group 43-54  0.014  0.014  0.013 
   Disabled  0.094  0.103  0.083 
   Non-disabled  0.011  0.011  0.010 
   Single individuals  0.021  0.017  0.027 
   Individuals in couples  0.011  0.015  0.006 
£1 in-work effect on exit rates     
Overall exit rate  -0.008  -0.010  -0.005 
   Age group 20-30  -0.009  -0.010  -0.007 
   Age group 30-42  -0.008  -0.010  -0.005 
   Age group 43-54  -0.008  -0.011  -0.004 
   Disabled  -0.022  -0.028  -0.015 
   Non-disabled  -0.007  -0.009  -0.005 
   Single individuals  -0.009  -0.006  -0.013 
   Individuals in couples  -0.008  -0.013  -0.001 
      
ENTRY (in %)       
Overall entry rate   18.94  22.61  16.85 
   Age group 20-30  29.02  38.67  23.23 
   Age group 30-42  17.48  18.86  16.89 
   Age group 43-54  12.04  13.70  10.76 
   Disabled   5.74 5.38 6.09 
   Non-disabled   29.01  46.17  22.65 
   Single individuals  18.98  22.51  15.97 
   Individuals in couples  18.89  22.82  17.61 32 | MYCK & REED
 
 
Table 12. Continued 
£1 out-of-work effect on entry rates     
Overall entry rate  -0.064  -0.097  -0.045 
   Age group 20-30  -0.108  -0.148  -0.084 
   Age group 30-42  -0.045  -0.085  -0.027 
   Age group 43-54  -0.050  -0.069  -0.035 
   Disabled  -0.041  -0.053  -0.029 
   Non-disabled  -0.086  -0.158  -0.057 
   Single individuals  -0.096  -0.099  -0.094 
   Individuals in couples  -0.027  -0.093  -0.004 
£1 in-work effect on entry rates     
Overall entry rate  0.036  0.035  0.037 
   Age group 20-30  0.063  0.064  0.063 
   Age group 30-42  0.032  0.033  0.032 
   Age group 43-54  0.018  0.016  0.021 
   Disabled  0.010  0.009  0.010 
   Non-disabled  0.057  0.071  0.052 
   Single individuals  0.057  0.044  0.067 
   Individuals in couples  0.012  0.015  0.011 
Note: Effects on entry and exit rates are presented as percentage point changes relative to the baseline rates. 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
 
As far as the effect of changes in income out of work on work entry is concerned, the 
percentage point changes suggest that non-disabled persons are more responsive than disabled 
persons. A £1 change in net income out of work reduces the entry rate by 0.041 of a percentage 
point for disabled persons and by 0.086 for the non-disabled. On the other hand a £1 change in 
income in work increases the entry probability for disabled persons by 0.010 and of non-
disabled persons by 0.057 of a percentage point. Yet if we take the effect on entry rates relative 
to the baseline entry rates, we find that out-of-work income has a greater negative effect on the 
entry rate of disabled persons, and the effect of a £1 change in in-work income is almost the 
same for the disabled and non-disabled population.  
The above results suggest that fiscal policy targeted at the disabled should be conducted with 
great care if it is to provide the correct set of incentives for disabled persons. It seems that 
changes in out-of-work income may have very strong negative effects on the employment of 
disabled persons, while changes in in-work income may not be sufficient to induce a significant 
employment response among individuals with disabilities. 
Employment effects of introducing the WFTC 
The estimated long-run change in the employment effect from introducing the WFTC is an 
increase of around 37,000 and this figure is statistically and significantly different from zero. 
On average, employment falls for couples, but rises for single persons (i.e. lone parents): when 
equilibrium effects are calculated separately for singles and couples (see section 4.2), we find 
that the WFTC increases employment among lone parents by about 37,000, while reducing 
employment among couples by about 3,000. The latter figure comes from a rise in employment 
among married/cohabiting men (+600) and a fall among married/cohabiting women (-3,300), 
although neither of these figures are statistically and significantly different from zero. To put 
this into perspective, in 1999 when the WFTC was introduced there were about 1.6 million lone 
parents in the UK (of whom around 50% were working) and about 5.3 million couples with 
dependent children (of whom around 95% had at least one earner in work.). In Figure 1 we TAX AND BENEFIT REFORMS IN A MODEL OF LABOUR MARKET TRANSITIONS | 33 
 
show the path of the long-run equilibrium employment effect of the reform. The convergence 
path is presented separately for single persons and couples and also for the entire sample.
18 We 
can see that the long-run equilibrium effect is reached quickly, after about ten iterations.  
Figure 1. Employment effect of the WFTC reform 
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Source: Authors’ calculations. 
 
In Table 13 we present some more detailed breakdowns of the simulated short-run effects. The 
top part of the table presents the grossed-up 1999-00 sample on which the simulation is run. The 
table then shows exit rates, the effect of the WFTC reform on exit rates, entry rates and the 
effect of the reform on the probability to enter. All the results are shown separately for men and 
women and together for the whole sample, and are split by age group and disability status. The 
WFTC reduces exits among lone parents, but increases exits among parents in couples. Overall, 
the exit rate among parents falls by about 0.024 of a percentage point, and the fall is 
concentrated among the younger part of the population. Exit rates rise among disabled persons, 
probably because working disabled parents are most likely to be living in couples. 
Nevertheless, the WFTC increases the probability of entry for almost all groups of parents we 
consider. It is negative only for disabled mothers in couples. The overall entry rate increases by 
0.4 of a percentage point and the increase is much higher for women. This is to a large extent 
determined by the fact that the probability of entry among single mothers increases by 1 
percentage point from 12.6% to 13.5%. Among individuals in couples the increase in the 
probability of entry is higher for fathers.  
                                                      
18 The two separate convergence paths do not have to sum to the path generated for the full sample (see 
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Table 13. Effect of the introduction of the WFTC on entry and exit rates of individuals with 
children 
 Total  Men  Women 
Grossed-up population  9,054,000 3,838,000  5,216,000 
Exit sample  6,536,000 3,433,000  3,103,000 
Entry sample  2,517,000  405,000  2,113,000 
Disabled in exit sample 353,000  179,000 174,000 
Disabled in entry sample  745,000  238,000  506,000 
Lone parents in exit sample  667,000  55,000  612,000 
Lone parents in entry sample  892,000  36,000  857,000 
      
EXIT (in %)       
Overall exit rate  4.12  4.99  3.16 
   Age group 20-30  6.89  8.41  5.55 
   Age group 30-42  3.94  5.15  2.71 
   Age group 43-54  3.27  3.52  2.90 
   Disabled  8.85  9.62  8.06 
   Non-disabled  3.85  4.73  2.87 
   Single parents  8.31  6.89  8.44 
   Couples  3.64  4.96  1.86 
Effect of WFTC reform on exit 
rates 
    
Overall exit rate  -0.024  0.018  -0.071 
   Age group 20-30  -0.105  -0.002  -0.195 
   Age group 30-42  -0.013  0.030  -0.057 
   Age group 43-54  -0.012  0.006  -0.037 
   Disabled  0.044  0.047  0.040 
   Non-disabled  -0.028  0.017  -0.078 
   Single parents  -0.419  -0.292  -0.431 
   Couples  0.021  0.024  0.017 
      
ENTRY (in %)      
Overall entry rate  16.66  18.31  16.35 
   Age group 20-30  17.17  23.43  16.62 
   Age group 30-42  17.51  20.21  17.05 
   Age group 43-54  13.44  13.87  13.22 
   Disabled  6.39  6.49  6.34 
   Non-disabled  20.98  35.23  19.50 
   Single parents  12.40  6.77  12.64 
   Couples  19.00  19.42  18.88 
Effect of WFTC reform on 
entry rates 
    
Overall entry rate  0.361  0.124  0.407 
   Age group 20-30  0.585  0.229  0.616 
   Age group 30-42  0.303  0.133  0.333 
   Age group 43-54  0.146  0.071  0.183 
   Disabled  0.024  0.093  -0.008 
   Non-disabled  0.503  0.169  0.537 
   Single parents  0.936  0.486  0.955 
   Couples  0.046  0.089  0.033 
Notes: Only individuals with children; reform effects presented as percentage point changes in probability to enter or exit. 
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7. Conclusions 
A change of government in the UK in 1997 led to a series of reforms to the system of in-work 
and out-of-work transfer payments for individuals on low incomes with children or disabilities 
(or both). The consequent introduction of the Working Families’ Tax Credit and the Disabled 
Persons Tax Credit in 1999 provides an ideal changed policy environment for using 
microeconometric modelling to estimate labour supply responses to changes in the financial 
incentives encountered by individuals and couples. In this paper we have developed a semi-
structural model of labour supply and demonstrated its usefulness with regard to simulating tax 
and benefit reforms, using data from a period in the UK in which the system of support for 
disabled and non-disabled persons underwent considerable change as a result of reforms 
introduced by the Labour government. We have addressed the question of how one can include 
disabled persons in a labour supply model and explicitly account for differences in financial 
incentives between the disabled and non-disabled populations. The methodology we present 
considers important features of the labour market, such as the fixed cost of work and the take-up 
of benefits, and takes advantage of observed labour market dynamics to identify the factors 
determining labour market behaviour. We have also presented methodologies for assigning 
financial incentives to individuals with disabilities and we hope these can be applied in other 
labour market studies. Although the methods are computationally intensive, it seems that the 
gain in terms of precision from calculating financial incentives for disabled persons justifies 
their use.  
Our estimations suggest that financial incentives are important determinants of labour market 
transitions, for both single persons and those living in couples. The effect of financial incentives 
could be more precisely estimated for single persons than for couples, which could stem from 
the more complex nature of labour market decisions among the latter. The models also suggest 
that financial incentives play a greater role among individuals with children and among the 
disabled than for non-disabled persons without children. We find that in several models the 
coefficients on financial incentives for non-disabled persons without children are not 
statistically significant. The estimated correlations among partners in couples suggest that 
partners tend to choose the same employment states. From the point of view of policy-making it 
is important to stress the difference in responsiveness to changes in the out-of-work income 
between disabled and non-disabled persons. The first group are much more likely to react to 
changes in out-of-work income (in terms of both increases in the exit probability and reductions 
in the entry probability). On the other hand, the responsiveness to changes in income in work is 
(proportionally) almost the same for disabled and non-disabled individuals.  
This paper has also presented the results of a simulation on tax and benefit reform using the 
model. The simulated results of the WFTC reform are broadly in line with other results from the 
labour supply literature (Blundell et al., 2000, Blundell & Reed, 2000 and Brewer et al., 2003). 
The introduction of the WFTC increases employment by 37,000. In a simulation exercise in 
which we changed net incomes by ₤1 per week for all individuals and couples we found an 
important difference in the responsiveness to changes in income in and out of work between 
disabled and non-disabled persons. The results suggest that policies other than increasing 
financial incentives in work should be considered if the government wants to increase the 
participation of disabled persons in the labour market.   
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Appendix 
Modelling financial incentives – Benefit claim scenarios in TAXBEN 
This appendix outlines the methodology for computing financial incentives. Because disability 
benefits in the model are allocated on the basis of the actual benefit receipt reported in the LFS, 
the number of scenarios under which we calculate incomes in the FRS needs to correspond to 
different observed combinations of benefit claim in the LFS.  
The need to distinguish between incomes with and without certain disability benefits in the LFS 
implies that for each disabled person and each scenario we have to calculate incomes under two 
assumptions: assuming that the person receives the benefit and assuming that s/he does not 
receive it. Moreover, since some benefits can be and are claimed jointly we also need to 
consider the possibility of the joint claiming of benefits.  
To explain how the methodology works let us consider an example. Let us say that we want to 
assign financial incentives to a person who is disabled and is recorded in the LFS as claiming 
DLA in both periods (t-1) and (t). Since incomes are calculated in the FRS and then transferred 
to the LFS as group averages to represent the financial incentives of this person correctly we 
need the average for this group to include the DLA. This can be achieved by calculating 
incomes for all individuals in the group and making them all eligible for the DLA. Of course if 
it is the case that in the LFS we also have a person who does not claim the DLA and belongs to 
the same ‘income’ group, then for all individuals in the group we also need to calculate incomes 
assuming that none of the group members claims the DLA.  
Tables A1 and A2 show the number of options for which we calculate incomes for single 
persons and couples respectively. For persons with children we calculate incomes in 51 
scenarios for couples and 16 scenarios for singles. Some necessary simplifications had to be 
made to limit the computational intensity. For example, for couples we calculate the DLA in 
scenarios in which only the man receives it (although incomes with the DLA are then allocated 
taking into account the actual claim of both partners). In order to be able to implement the full 
extended model with take-up equations for the WFTC (in line with the methodology presented 
in section 2) for families with children we also calculate incomes assuming zero take-up of the 
WFTC. These incomes are then used to calculate the expected value of the WFTC given the 
WFTC take-up equations. 
Incomes in 16 scenarios for singles and 51 scenarios for couples are calculated for all benefit 
units in the FRS samples. We then calculate group averages for all these incomes and move 
them across to the LFS. Depending on reported benefit-claim data in the LFS, individuals in the 
LFS (and thus in the final transitions model) are assigned income with the disability benefits 
they are recorded as receiving. Because we calculate net incomes with and without disability 
benefits for all persons in the FRS ‘disabled’ groups, the group average should accurately reflect 
the difference between net income with and without the modelled disability benefits. The 
method also includes WFTC take-up modelling, which is done separately for each of the 
scenarios in which single individuals or couples can claim the WFTC (with or without other 
benefits). As in the original model the WFTC take-up modelling stage takes place before 
matching incomes with the LFS, but this time it is done several times for each potential 
employment state (in different disability-benefit claim scenarios). 
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With all this computational intensity on the FRS/TAXBEN side, it is really important to allocate 
the appropriate income to the individuals and couples in the LFS to correctly reflect the 
financial incentives the individuals encounter. As outlined in the paper, the allocation of 
incomes in the LFS is made conditional on: 
•  receipt of disability benefits in period (t); 
•  employment state at period (t-1); and 
•  employment state at period (t). 
Table A1. Modelling incomes with disability benefits – Singles 
Scenario Working/not  working  DLA  IB  DPTC 
1 No  No  No  No 
2  Yes, no childcare subs.  No  No  No 
3*  Yes, with childcare subs.  No  No  No 
4  Yes, no childcare subs.  No  No  Yes 
5*  Yes, with childcare subs.  No  No  Yes 
6 No  Yes  No  No 
7  Yes, no childcare subs.  Yes  No  No 
8*  Yes, with childcare subs.  Yes  No  No 
9  Yes, no childcare subs.  Yes  No  Yes 
10*  Yes, with childcare subs.  Yes  No  Yes 
11 No No  Yes  No 
12 No Yes  Yes  No 
Notes: For families with children in scenarios marked with * we calculate incomes also under the assumption of 0% 
take-up of WFTC. The incomes with and without WFTC are then used to calculate the expected value of the 
WFTC in the WFTC take-up equation. This gives the total of 10 TAXBEN runs for each single individual in 
the FRS. 
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Table A2. Modelling incomes with disability benefits – Couples 
Scenario  (Man, woman) 
  Employment status  DLA claim  IB claim  DPTC 
1 (0,0)  (0/0)  (0/0)  (0/0) 
2* (0,1)  (0/0)  (0/0)  (0/0) 
3* (1,0)  (0/0)  (0/0)  (0/0) 
4  (1,1) (without childcare)  (0/0)  (0/0)  (0/0) 
5* (1,1)  (with  childcare)  (0/0)  (0/0) (0/0) 
6* (0,1)  (0/0)  (0/0)  (0/1) 
7* (1,0)  (0/0)  (0/0)  (1/0) 
8  (1,1) (without childcare)  (0/0)  (0/0)  (1/0) 
9* (1,1)  (with  childcare)  (0/0)  (0/0) (1/0) 
10 (0,0)  (1/0)  (0/0)  (0/0) 
11* (0,1) (1/0)  (0/0)  (0/0) 
12* (1,0) (1/0)  (0/0)  (0/0) 
13  (1,1) (without childcare)  (1/0)  (0/0)  (0/0) 
14* (1,1)  (with  childcare) (1/0)  (0/0)  (0/0) 
15* (0,1) (1/0)  (0/0)  (0/1) 
16* (1,0) (1/0)  (0/0)  (1/0) 
17  (1,1) (without childcare)  (1/0)  (0/0)  (1/0) 
18* (1,1)  (with  childcare) (1/0)  (0/0)  (1/0) 
19 (0,0)  (1/0)  (1/0)  (0/0) 
20* (0,1) (1/0)  (1/0)  (0/0) 
21* (0,1) (1/0)  (1/0)  (0/1) 
22* (1,0) (1/0)  (0/1)  (0/0) 
23* (1,0) (1/0)  (0/1)  (1/0) 
24 (0,0)  (0/0)  (0/1)  (0/0) 
25* (0,1) (0/0)  (1/0)  (0/0) 
26* (0,1) (0/0)  (1/0)  (0/1) 
27* (1,0) (0/0)  (0/1)  (0/0) 
28 (0,0)  (0,0)  (1,0)  (0,0) 
29* (1,0) (0/0)  (0/1)  (1/0) 
30 (0,0)  (1/0)  (1/1)  (0,0) 
31 (0,0)  (0/0)  (1/1)  (0,0) 
Notes: For employment states, 1 = working and 0 = not working, which are presented above as (head, spouse); for 
benefit claims, 1 = claims benefit and 0 = does not claim, which are presented as (head/spouse)  
For families with children for scenarios marked with * we calculate incomes also under an assumption of 0% 
take-up of WFTC. The incomes with and without the WFTC are then used to calculate the expected value of 
the WFTC in the WFTC take-up equation. This gives the total of 28 TAXBEN runs for each couple in the 
FRS. 
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A take-up model for the Incapacity Benefit 
In assigning financial incentives to disabled persons who are in work at time t, incentives in the 
out-of-work scenario (which may include the IB) cannot be based on reported benefit claims, 
since the IB is a benefit that is only paid conditional on the claimant being out of work. 
Although some of the working disabled may be eligible to claim IB when out of work, we 
cannot observe this potential eligibility in the LFS. To model financial incentives as accurately 
as possible we propose to calculate incentives in the out-of-work scenario by assuming partial 
take-up estimated on the basis of an IB take-up model.  
For several reasons the standard approach to estimating take-up equations seems unsuitable for 
the estimation of the IB take-up model. First of all, unlike in the case of the WFTC, in the IB 
case we do not know if a person is eligible for the IB if he or she were to be out of work. In 
estimating the WFTC take-up equation the data contains all the characteristics that condition 
eligibility (number of children, hours worked, savings and income) and the only final condition 
is income at a certain number of hours worked, which can be estimated. As far as IB eligibility 
is concerned, self-reported disability status, which is recorded in the data, is not a sufficient 
condition for IB eligibility. IB eligibility requires (for example) being assessed as incapable of 
work and having paid sufficient NI contributions. For this reason IB eligibility can change even 
if all of the reported characteristics of a disabled person remain the same. In such circumstances 
any model of the ‘take-up’ of Incapacity Benefit will in fact be a joint model of eligibility and 
take-up.  
While for persons observed in the LFS who are out of work we have a record of their IB claim, 
for those in work we will not have this information. On the basis of observed characteristics 
alone there is no way of determining the IB eligibility of a person who is currently working if 
this person were to leave work. We therefore have to infer the joint probability of eligibility and 
claim from the information available. One way of determining IB eligibility/take-up of a person 
who is currently working if this person were to leave work would be to look at the probabilities 
of IB receipt among those out of work conditional on observed characteristics and apply them to 
the sample of employees. Such an approach would rely on the assumption that there are no 
systematic differences between those in work and those out of work conditional on observed 
characteristics. It is highly likely, however, that there are systematic differences between those 
in and out of work as far as IB eligibility is concerned. This means that a simple probit 
estimation of IB receipt conditional on observed characteristics will be biased. We therefore 
propose to use a Heckman corrected-probability model with which we should be able to correct 
for a potential selection bias if suitable instruments are available.  
We use two models of selection-corrected probability of the IB receipt among the disabled 
population. One estimates the probability of claiming the IB (at time t) among those who were 
out of work at time (t-1) and are still out of work at time t, and another among those who were 
working at time (t-1) and are out of work at time (t). The selection process we wish to control 
for is therefore leaving the sample of those out of work in the first case, and entering the sample 
of persons out of work in the second case.  
Let us define the dependent variable ‘ib’ as 1 if a disabled person receives the IB and 0 if s/he 
does not: 
i i i t i t i t i t X work h work disabled ib P ε β α + + = = = = = − ) 0 , , 1 | 1 ( , , 1 , ,    for h=1 or h=0    (A1) 
The variable ib is only observed if the person is out of work and we therefore have to define a 
selection equation: 
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If the residuals εi and νi from these two equations are correlated, then the simple probit equation 
of ib on Xi will be biased. 
Our a priori hypothesis is that disabled persons who enter work are less likely to receive the IB 
in the out-of-work state, and that disabled persons who leave work are more likely to receive the 
IB than those who stay employed. We use demographic characteristics, information on home 
ownership and whether the job at time (t-1) was permanent to identify the selection equation.
†  
Table A3 presents results from the two estimations. In both equations selection into the sample 
(i.e. not being employed and thus potentially eligible for IB) is statistically significant, and those 
in the sample are more likely to claim the IB than those who are out of the sample at time (t), 
i.e. those who are in work. 
Table A3. Results of the IB receipt equation 
  If worked at (t-1)  If did not work at (t-1) 
  Coeff. s.e.   Coeff.  s.e.   
IB receipt equation             
Year 2000  -0.0304  (0.0960)    -0.0141  (0.0406)   
Year 2001  0.0944  (0.0971)    0.0903  (0.0405)  ** 
Year 2002  0.0124  (0.0958)    0.0355  (0.0403)   
Male dummy  0.2919  (0.0760)  ***  0.3652  (0.0301)  *** 
Left school aged 17-18  -0.1558  (0.1030)    0.0275  (0.0466)   
Left school aged 19+  -0.1542  (0.1309)    -0.1397  (0.0555)  ** 
Age – 16  0.0206  (0.0032)  ***  0.0127  (0.0015)  *** 
Lives in London/SE  -0.3971  (0.0841)  ***  -0.0026  (0.0353)   
Married/cohabiting -0.1340  (0.0772) *  0.0361  (0.0297)   
Received IB at (t-1)  –  –    2.4890  (0.0345)  *** 
Constant -1.4502  (0.2252)  ***  -1.8180  (0.0574)  *** 
Selection equation            
Year 2000  -0.0255  (0.0463)    -0.0176  (0.0528)   
Year 2001  0.0166  (0.0475)    0.0147  (0.0544)   
Year 2002  -0.0746  (0.0458)    -0.0400  (0.0529)   
Male dummy  -0.1677  (0.0339)  ***  -0.1258  (0.0403)  *** 
Left school aged 17-18  -0.1503  (0.0467)  ***  -0.0931  (0.0548)  * 
Left school aged 19+  -0.2988  (0.0548)  ***  -0.0604  (0.0644)   
Age – 16  -0.0491  (0.0076)  ***  0.0107  (0.0086)   
Age – 16 squared  0.0012  (0.0001)  ***  0.0003  (0.0002)  * 
Lives in London/SE  -0.1441  (0.0383)  ***  -0.1106  (0.0440)  ** 
Married/cohabiting -0.1091  (0.0391) ***  -0.1922  (0.0432)  *** 
Received IB at (t-1)  –  –    0.5744  (0.0495)  *** 
Has child aged <5  0.2337  (0.0593)  ***  -0.2545  (0.0409)  *** 
Has three+ children   0.1597  (0.0710) **  0.0852  (0.0672)   
House owner  0.3546  (0.0616)  ***  0.0575  (0.0634)   
Job at (t-1) was temporary  -0.3692  (0.0398)  ***  –  –   
Constant -0.3449  (0.1051)  ***  1.2737  (0.1147)  *** 
Athrho 0.4443  (0.1834)  **  0.5256  (0.2619)  ** 
Rho 0.4172  (0.1515)    0.4820  (0.2011)   
No. observations  9593    14800   
Uncensored observations  1275    14118   
Log likelihood  -4371.35    -7074.82   
*** significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 10% 
Notes:  Rho – measure of correlation between the men’s and the women’s equations; Athrho – a transformation of Rho that is used 
in the estimation of bivariate probit 
Source: Authors’ calculations.  
                                                      
† The last instrument can only be used for the case in which we estimate the probability of IB receipt 
among those who were employed at (t-1). REVISER – Research Training Network on 
Health, Ageing and Retirement 
 
 
 
REVISER was launched by several members of the ENEPRI network in August 2003. 
The project was financed under the programme on Improving the Human Research 
Potential & the Socio-Economic Knowledge Base of the 5
th EU Research Framework 
Programme.  
 
The REVISER project finances training stays for young researchers in the following six 
research institutes:  
 
•  CEPS (Centre for European Policy Studies), Brussels 
•  CPB (Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis), The Hague 
•  DIW (Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung), Berlin  
•  ETLA (the Research Institute of the Finnish Economy), Helsinki 
•  FEDEA (Fundación de Estudios de Economía Aplicada), Madrid 
•  LEGOS (Laboratoire d’Economie et de Gestion des Organisations de Santé,   
Université de Paris-Dauphine), Paris 
 
Trainees participate in research conducted in the areas of population ageing, health and 
retirement in the institutes in which they are placed, often in the context of common 
research projects developed by consortiums of ENEPRI partners. Trainees must be 
nationals of an EU member state or associated state, or must have resided in the EU for 
at least five years immediately prior to their appointment. This network aims at fostering 
the mobility of researchers. Thus, trainees must not be nationals of the state in which 
the institute appointing them is located and must not have carried out their normal 
activities in that state for more than 12 of the 24 months prior to the appointment.  
 
This project is coordinated by Jorgen Mortensen, Associate Senior Research Fellow at 
CEPS. For further information, contact him at: jorgen.mortensen@ceps.be. About ENEPRI 
he European Network of Economic Policy Research Institutes (ENEPRI) is composed of leading 
socio-economic research institutes in practically all EU member states and candidate countries that 
are committed to working together to develop and consolidate a European agenda of research. 
ENEPRI was launched in 2000 by the Brussels-based Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS), which 
provides overall coordination for the initiative.  
While the European construction has made gigantic steps forward in the recent past, the European 
dimension of research seems to have been overlooked. The provision of economic analysis at the 
European level, however, is a fundamental prerequisite to the successful understanding of the 
achievements and challenges that lie ahead. ENEPRI aims to fill this gap by pooling the research efforts 
of its different member institutes in their respective areas of specialisation and to encourage an explicit 
European-wide approach. 
 
ENEPRI is composed of the following member institutes: 
CASE  Center for Social and Economic Research, Warsaw, Poland 
CEE  Center for Economics and Econometrics, Bogazici University, Istanbul, Turkey 
CEPII  Centre d’Études Prospectives et d’Informations Internationales, Paris, France 
CEPS  Centre for European Policy Studies, Brussels, Belgium 
CERGE-EI  Centre for Economic Research and Graduated Education, Charles University, Prague, 
Czech Republic 
CPB  Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis, The Hague, The Netherlands 
DIW  Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung, Berlin, Germany 
ESRI  Economic and Social Research Institute, Dublin, Ireland 
ETLA  Research Institute for the Finnish Economy, Helsinki, Finland 
FEDEA  Fundación de Estudios de Economía Aplicada, Madrid, Spain 
FPB  Federal Planning Bureau, Brussels, Belgium 
IE-BAS  Institute of Economics, Bulgarian Academy of Sciences, Sofia, Bulgaria 
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